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OVERVIEW 
I.  Introduction 
Initially  conceived  for  intra-Community  balance-of-payments  support,  macro-financial 
assistance from the Community has been extended since  1990 to third countries,  mainly 
those of Central and  Eastern Europe,  but  progressively  also  to  other countries,  in  the 
former  Soviet  Union  and  in  the  Mediterranean  area,  with  a  view  to  supporting  their 
political and economic refofm efforts. 
As  the  Central  and  East  European  countries  (CEECs)  embarked  on  the  process  of 
transition to a market economy they were faced  with similar problems:  substantial costs 
attached to the first  steps of reform,  additional external shocks (the Gulf War emba__rgo, 
the  collapse  of COMECON},  insufficient  resources  available  from  the  international 
financial institutions (IFis) and virtually non-existent flows from the private sector. 
Against  this  background,  the European Community  decided  to  extend  macro-financial 
assistance to these countries to complement the financing provided by the IFis. It was also 
decided that, in the context of the assistance co-ordination process agreed among the 24 
industrial c:ountries (G-24) to help the CEECs, the Commission should enlist other donors 
to contribute in  a similar way to support the economic programmes that these countries 
were implementing in agreement with the IMF and the World Bank. 
A number of such support operations by  the EU  and  the G-24 took place  in  1990-1994 
covering most Central and East European countries eligible for G-24 assistance (Tables 1 
and 2). 
Outside  the  region  of Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  several  other  Community  loan 
operations were decided by the Council during this period.  In the context of Community 
support for Mediterranean countries adversely affected by  the Gulf conflict,  the Council 
made available a soft loan to Israel in July 1991. In September of  the same year a medium-
term loan was decided to help Algeria carry through the political and  economic reforms 
under way.' A further loan to Algeria was decided in late 1994.2  Operations for European 
Newly  Independent  States  (NIS)  were  also  approved  in  1994,  comprising  loans  for 
Moldova and Ukraine. 
In 1995, the focus of the Community's macro-financial assistance continued to shift away 
from  the Central  and  East  European group,  which,  as  a  result  of a  generally  positive 
economic performance, had less and  less need· to rely  on  external  financial  support from 
official sources. Instead, an increasing part of  Community loans were directed towards the 
NlS  and  the  Mediterranean  region.  While  further  amounts  were  disbursed  to  Albania, 
Rorhania and Lithuania, these were outweighed by  disbursements of a second tranche to 
2 
See: Report on the implen1entation of macro-financial assistance to third cou.ntries. COM(94 )229 of 7 
June 1994. 
See:  Report on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to  third countries, COM(95)572 of 
27 November 199.5. 2 
Moldova and  of new loans  to Belarus and  Ukraine.  In  addition  the  first  tranche of a 
second macro-financial loan to Algeria was disbursed. 3 
The Community's macro-financial assistance to all  third countries is governed by a set of 
principles which were drawn up on the initiative of the European Commission and agreed 
among the G-24 to serve as guidelines for the implementation of  EU/G-24 macro-financial 
assistance.  These principles,  which  were  subsequently  endorsed  by  the EU Council  of 
Ministers  of  Finance,  underline  the  exceptional  character  of  this  assistance,  its 
complementarity to financing from the IFis and its macro-economic conditionality. 
2.  Macro-financial assistance in 1996 
The shift of emphasis towards the NIS and  away from the CEECs which was evident in 
1994 and  1995 was maintained in  1996. There was only one new commitment, which was 
a loan of ECU  15  million to Moldova.  This was disbursed  in  December,  after the  IMF 
Board had approved a new three-year economic reform programme and the Commission 
services had confirmed that the conditions attached to the loan were met.  The other NIS 
/ 
country to which a loan was disbursed in  1996 was Ukraine, which received a first tranche 
of ECU 100 million from a ECU 200 million loan that had been agreed by the Council in 
October 1995 to complement assistance from the IFis and other bilateral donors aimed at 
supporting  the  efforts  of the  Ukrainian  authorities  to  pursue  economic  reform.  The 
situation in  B.elarus  was marked by a lack of progress in  some key aspects of structural 
reform  and  the  reversal  of some  measures  of liberalization.  Consequently,  the  second 
tranche ofthe ECU 55  million loan approved in  1995 was not disbursed. At the end ofthe 
year  consideration  was  being  given  to  providing  exceptional  financial  assistance  to 
Armenia and  Georgia and,  when appropriate,  to Tajikistan to  enable them to carry out 
fundamental  political  and  economic  reforms  in  the  context  of Hv1F  programmes.  An 
essential  pre-condition  for  such  assistance  will  be  full  settlement  of these  countries' 
outstanding financial obligations towards the Community. 
The Commission, after consulting the Monetary Committee, decided in early September 
1996  to disburse  the  second  tranche (ECU 20  million)  of a  ECU  3 5  million  grant  to 
Albania,  after the new government took measures to address the budgetary imbalances, 
which included the introduction of VAT,  and  on the basis  of progress in  implementing 
structural reforms stipulated in the Memorandum of Understanding. The second ECU 40 
million tranche of Bulgaria's loan ofECU 110 million approved in  1992 was at long last 
disbursed following the approval of a new IMF stand-by loan.  In  Lithuania improvement:; 
in  the  procedures  adopted  by  the  authorities  for  consulting  and  reporting  to  the 
Commission on the use being made of the first  ECU 2.5  million instalment of the second 
ECU 50 million tranche of Community assistance led  to the. lifting of the freeze that had 
been imposed on the use of  this assistance in  199 5. 
The smaller amounts disbursed in  1996 partly reflected the tendency for CEECs to have 
less need of external financing as their economies strengthened. Estonia not only did not 
draw on the second ECU 20  million  tranche of its  ECU 40 million  loan,  but sought to 
make  early  repayment  of the  first  tranche.  Elsewhere  the  reasons  for  the  absence  of 
3 See:  Repon on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to  third countries, COM(96) 695  of 8 
January 1997. 3 
disbursements were less satisfactory. The loan ofECU 130 million to Slovakia decided in 
1994  was  cancelled  because  of inadequate  progress  towards  agreement  between  the 
Slovak authorities and the Commission on the economic policy conditions to be attached 
to it,  and also because improved financial circumstances meant Slovakia had_ less need of 
this support. The second ECU 40 million tranche of the ECU 80  million loan to Latvia 
approved in 1992 was not released, despite the IMF's approval of  a stand-by arrangement 
in May 1996, because of die Commission's serious reservations about the way in which 
on-lending of the proceeds of the first tranche was being managed.  This assistance is  in 
any case not necessary for balance-of-payments purposes.  · 
At the end of  the year two requests for assistance were being actively examined. The new 
government  elected  in  Romania  in  November  asked  for  the  Community's  and  G-24's 
macro-financial assistance to be reactivated in the context of an ambitious programme of 
macroeconomic stabilization and  structural reforms supported by  the IFis.  At about the 
same time, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in  view of its difficult external 
situation, requested macro"'financial assistance to complement support from the IMF  a~d 
the World Bank for its three-year stabilization and reform programme.  In the light of the 
country's urgent  needs and  substantial progress in  transition to a market economy,  the 
Commission  initiated  internal  consultations  on  providing  Community  macro-financial 
assistance of up to ECU 40 million.  In view of the acute economic crisis in Bulgaria; the 
Commission began to examine the possibility of  further macro-financial assistance of  up to 
ECU  250 million  which  would  complement  funding  from  the  IFis  in  support  of an 
anticipated economic stabilization and structural reform programme. 
No disbursements of macro-financial assistance were made in the Mediterranean region in 
1996.  Discussions  took  place  between  the  Algerian  authorities  and  the  Commission 
services on disbursing the second tranche (up to ECU  I  00  million)  of the  1994 macro-
financial loan, but agreement was not reached on the conditions for its release, notably the 
calendar  for  implementing  a  programme  of privatization  of large  state  enterprises.  In 
December  1996~ however, the Commission decided as  part of the MEDA programme to 
support Algeria's structural reform programme through a Structural Adjustment Facility 
of  ECU 125 million. 
Community operations have continued to incorporate the set of principles applying to this 
type  of assistance.  In  particular,  Community  macro-financial  assistance  has  supported 
efforts by recipient countries to bring about economic reforms and  structural changes.  In 
close co-ordination with the::  Itvff and the World Bank,  it  has  promoted policies that are 
tailored  to specific  country  needs  with the overall  objective  of stabilizing  the  financial 
situation and  establishing market-oriented economies (macroeconomic perfcrmance and 
progress  in  reforms  in  beneficiary  countries  are  summarized  in  Tables  4  and  5  and 
discussed country by country in the following chapters). 
3.  Trends and tendencies in macro-financial assistance 
Two related trends present in  1995  were again  in  evidence  in  1996.  Both the range of 
(potential)  beneficiary  countries  and  the  range  of needs  widened.  The  spectrum  of 
(potential) beneficiary countries now runs from Armenia,  Georgia and Tajikistan, which 
have need of assistance for humanitarian reasons,  through to Central and East European 
countries  which  have  applied  for  membership  of the  European  Union  and  on  whose 4 
in the geographical focus of the Community's macro-financial assistance already observed 
in 1994 and 199 5 extended into  1996. 
The Community's  macro-financial  assistance was  originally  intended  to  support  macro-
economic  stabilization  and  the  balance  of payments.  Over  the  yeai:s  tpe  number  of 
countries  to  which  it  was  appropriate  for  the  Community  to  extend  such  support 
expanded,  as  a growing  number  of countries  neighbouring  the  Community  committed 
themselves  to  rigorous  programmes  of economic  reform.  This  led  to  a  change  in  the 
geographic balance  of assistance from  the  early  years,  when  most  beneficiary  countries 
were  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of the  Community,  to  the  present,  when  assistance  is 
increasingly flowing to somewhat more distant countries. 
It also became clear that,  while macro-financial assistance geared to the original objective 
of supporting  macro-ecohomic  stabilization  and  the  balance  of payments  was  still 
necessary for some  count~ies, in the case of others macro-financial assistance could more 
usefully be directed to. supporting the government's programme.<?f stll.Ktural reform.  ~his 
tendency  emerged  first  .in  some  Central  and  East  European  countries,  where  macro-
financial  assistance  for  'Structural  reforin  could  be  effectively  combined  with  technical 
assistance from the Phare programme to strengthen the capacity of institutions that were 
essential to the success of  the structural reform programmes.  The complementarity of the 
different forms  of Community assistance was  enhanced  by broadening the dialogue with 
each beneficiary country to  encompass the  totality of assistance to  reform efforts.  More 
recently,  similar  developments  have  occurred  in  the  context  of assistance  to  some  NIS 
countries.  A comf:)arable  evolution  has  taken  place  in  the  programmes  supported  by  the 
IMF and the World Bank, and this has led to clm:er co-operation between the Commission 
and these institutions.  "'  · 
For the CEECs the focus on structural reform will be further emphasised in the context of 
their preparation for accession to the EU.  The European Council  in Copenhagen in  June 
1993  agreed  that  any associated  country in  Central and  Eastern Europe .  that so  desired 
should become a member state as soon as  it was able to  satisfy the requisite political and 
economic conditions. The process of drawing up  opinions on whether the ten associated 
countries of Central  and  Eastern Europe satisfy these conditions began in  1996  and  has 
since been completed. 
The  associated  countries  in  preparing  for  accession  to  the  EU  will  need  substantial 
investment  in  areas  such  as  environmental  protection,  transport,  energy,  industrial 
restructuring,· agricultural  infrastructure and  rural  society.  Policy-based  financial  support 
will  also  continue to  be  necessary to  facilitate  the  acceleration of structural  adjustment. 
Careful consideration will therefore have to be given to how the Union's various forms of 
assistance and instruments can be used most effectively to contribute to this effort. It will 
also be necessary to intensify co-operation with the IFis so as to achieve ·as much synergy 
as  possible with their lending  in  support of structural  reform  and  to  ensure consistency 
between EU conditionality related to accession and conditionality associated with the IFis 
operations. 
4.  Burden-sharing 
Since the inception of macro-financial assistance, the absolute amounts committed by the 
EU have fluctuated substantially (Tables 3 and 3.1), but as a proportion of total balance-
of-payments support, Community macro-financial assistance has showed a steady decline. s 
Initially, Ul important feature of  Community assistance was that very large sums of  money 
were  found  to  support  the  programmes  of the  Bretton  Woods  institutions.  The 
Community played a key role, both as a major provider of  these funds and from  1991  as 
the co-ordinator of  bilateral assistance for the CEECs through the G-24. 
The IFis, however, were progressively able to mobilize  more resources:  a new  lending 
instrument, the Systemic TFansformation Facility (STF) was created· which,  together with 
the increase in  th~ access limits, enabled the IMF to increase its assistance to CEECs and 
countries of  the former Soviet Union. The World Bank, for its part, developed successive 
generatioas of policy-based balance-of-payments operations (Structural Adjustment loans 
- SAL-, followed by Enterprise and Financial Sector Adjustment loans- EFSAL).  As a 
result, the share of  the IFis in the financing packages has risen substantially (Table 3). 
At  the  same  time,  contributions  oy  external  creditors,  both  public  and  private,  were 
mobilized in  the  form  of. debt-relief and  debt-reduction  operations  (Algeria,  Bulgaria, 
Ukraine),  which  account~ for  a  substantial  share  of balance-of-payments  support .in 
1991,  1994 and  1995. In 1996 debt relief  (to Moldova) accounted for a smaller shafe of 
balance-of-payments ~upport.  ·  ..-
The increase in the resources provided by the IFis resulted in the lending of  the EU and of 
other bilateral donors (excluding debt relief operations) declining sharply as a proportion 
of total  commitments,  from  54%  and  25%,  respectively,  in  1990  to  7%  an~ 4%, 
respectively,  in  1996 (or 6% and  3%, respectively,  of total commitments including debt 
relief operations).4  While  the  EU's  share  of total  balance-of-payments  support  has 
declined, its share of  bilateral balance-of-payments support has remained roughly constant 
on average at around 60 per cent throughout the period 1990-96 (Table 2). 
4  These statistics cover only the countries to which the EU has provided macro-financial assistance. 6 
Tallie It COMMUNITY MACilO.nNANCIAL AIIIIT  ANCE TO THIRD COUNTRIES 
Sa1ua or aft'aclive di..,_..  u of o-nbar 1996 (in rnillionl of  ECU) 
M••l•••••aal  DlluC  Dillllalll  4maYDIIIId ~~~  LIIIIIIIIIIEIIII 
III1UduJI  ~  g[  dii~WtiiiDIDII 
1ll5iliiiD 
& Mamt:lllldlllllilllllilll  ~IEC:a 
H•a..,.l  170  ll02 90  610  JSO- Apr  1990  160 
(lllniCIUral acij-loan)  260- Feb  1991 
Caacll aad .,.,..., Fadwal a.p.bllc  375  25.02.91  375  II~- M11.  1991 
(BOP'-)  190- Mar  1992 
H ••  ..,.u  110  24.06.91  110  100-AUJ.  1991 
(BOP loan)  10 -Jan.  1993 
l•lprial  190  24.0691  190  150-Aull  1991 
(BOP loan)  140- Mil  1992 
....... ,  J75  22.07 91  375  190- Jan.  1992 
(BOP loan)  115- Apr  1992 
Albulal  70  21.09 92  70  35- Dec  1992 
(BOP.,.,t)  35- Au~ 1993 
Bolda  110  23  11.92  135  15 
(BOP loans) 
of  which: 
Esto•l•  40  10  Mar  1993  10 
LaiYia  10  40  M11  1993  40 
Ut.lt•ula  100  75  SO- Jul.  1993  25 
25-""' 1995 
•••••1•11  10  27  II 92  10  Feb  !'I'll 
(BOP loan) 
lulprlall·  110  19.10 92  110  70-Dco  1994 
(BOP loan)  40 • .~U~  1996 
~~o  .....  Ill  125  :e  t•~.,  ~..~  ~~  ,,\\  [•}1)5  70 
(BOP loan) 
Albaalall  35  ~~ II 94  35  II- Jun  199~ 
(BOP.,.,t)  10 ·OCI  I  'I% 
SIOYalda  130  1~ 1194  Concrllod  lui  1996  130 
(BOP loan) 
TOTAL A  1160  1315  545 
I  Masa:DIIIIiiiiiiiiiiiiEI 11 alba: Jblr::li 'aua1d1a 
......  (I)  117.5  22.0791  117.5  M11  1992 
(lllruellnl adju-aollloan) 
Alprial  400  23 09 91  400  250-Jan.l992 
(BOP loan)  1~0- Aull  1994 
MoldOYal  45  130694  45  ~~-Dec 1994 
(BOP loan)  ~0. ""¥  1995 
Alaorla II  100  22.12.~  100  No>·  1995  100 
(BOP loan) 
Ukralaol  IS  2.2  12 94  15  Dec  1995 
(BOP loan) 
........  55  10 04.95  30  Dec  1995  15 
(BOP loan) 
Ukralaoll  100  23  10 9~  100  50- Au11  1996  100 
(BOP loan)  50- OCI  1996 
MoldOYoll  15  2503%  15  Dec  1996 
(BOP loan) 
TOTAL 8  1117.5  961.5  115 
TOTALA+I  4047.5  Jl77.5  770 
(I)  Auillanee 10 l..el includa a loan principal amount of  E<  onto of  ECU 27 5 million 
in lhe fatm o(i-roaalillboidia. 7 
Tablel: IUIG-14 •IICI'e-ftulldaiPiilta-to C..tnlaN l.uten l:•re,. alaee 1991 (cu••l•liv• ••o11all) 
(S1ahal u of Dlcamb« 96) 
Collntry  ALBANIA  BALTIC STATES  BULGARIA 
(lclemified  (US S 237 million)  (US $ 600 million)  (US S 1130 million) 
lwtt 
Commitmenu  Disburs.  Commitmenu  Disbun.  Commitments  Disbun. 
Min  %of  %of  Min  %of  Min  %of  %of  Min  %of  Min  %of  %of  Min  %or 
\ISS  gap  commit.  US$  disb.  US$  pp  commit.  US$  disb.  US$  II•P  commit.  uss  disb. 
- Commllllity  123.S  Sl.l  71.0  123.S  16.9  300.0  so.o  57.4  114.0  54.0  533.3  47.2  64.1  533.3  71.9 
EFTA•  14.2  6.0  l.l  10.1  7.1  123.1  20.5  23.5  67.9  19.9  129.5  IU  15.6  91.5  13.3 
Unillad Slata  10.0  0.9  1.2  10.0  1.3 
Japan  36.3  15.3  20.9  1.5  6.0  100.0  16.7  19.1  11.9  26.1  150.0  13.3  18.0  100.0  IB 
Odlcn  8.7  0.1  1.0 
Total  174.0  73.4  100.0  141.1  100.0  .SlJ.I  17.1  100.0  340.1  100.0  131.!1  73.6  100.0  741.1  100.0 
!•  of which. A, S, SF  I  11.7 I  4.9 I  6.7 I  10.1  I  1.1 I  Btl  13.5 I  IS.S I  67.91  19.91  69.o I  6.1  I  a.3 I  5o.o I  6.71 
Country  CSFR  lfl.INGARY (I)  ROMANIA 
(Identified  (US S 1000 million)  (US S 500 million)  (US S 145~· million) 
l~l 
Commiunenu  Disburs.  Commitments  Disburs.  Commitments  Disbun. 
Min  %of  •oof  Min  %of  Min  %of  %of  Min  ~~of  Min  %of  %of  Min 
lJSS  PP  commit.  uss  disb.  uss  pp  commit.  US$  disb.  uss  wap  commit.  US$ 
Community  500.0  SO.O  56.4  500.0  SI.O  250.0  50.0  48.3  250.0  SO.?  740.6  S0.9  68.9  660.7 
EFTA •  146.0  14.6  16.5  146.0  16.9  9'-0  19.0  18.3  9S.O  19.3  162.2  11.1  IS.I  146.3 
United Statcs  ISO  u  1.7  1~.0  1.7  10.0  2.0  1.9  10 0  ~.0 
Japan  200.0  20.0  ~2.5  ~Oo.O  ~J.~  1500  30.0  ~9 0  ~~~ 0  ~5  ~  1~0 0  10.3  14.0  100.0 
Othm  26.0  2.6  29  1.0  0.1  12.1  2.6  2.~  128  2.6  220  I.S  2.0  22.0 
Total  .7.0  18.7  100.0  161.0  1110.0  !117.1  103.6  1110.0  491.1  1110.0  1074.8  73.9  100.0  919.0 
{• of  which. A, S, SF  I  90.0 I  9.b I  10.1 I  9o.o J  1d.41  sol  10.0 I  9.71  sol  10.1 I  17.3 I  6.o I  1.1  I  &1.4  I 
Country  SLOVAKIA  TOTAL 
(lclentifitd  (USS 300 million)  (US S 5222 million) 
pps) 
Commitments  Disburs.  Commitments  Disburs. 
Min  %of  ~·.of  Min  %of  Min  ~or  %of  Min  %of 
uss  pp  commit.  US$  disb.  uss  pp  commit.  uss  disb. 
Community  156.0  n.o  64  I  l60l.S  49.9  61.2  22SU  63  I 
EFTA•  27.4  9.1  11.2  697.3  13.4  16.4  S63.8  IS 8 
United States  3S.O  0.7  0.8  JS.O  1.0 
Japan  600  20.0  24.7  60.0  100.0  146.3  16.2  19.9  612.4  19.1 
Olhen  69.5  1.3  1.6  35.1  1.0 
Total  I  J.U.4  81.1  100.0  60.0  1110.0  41!11.6  II  .  .&  1110.0  3561.!1  1110.0 
I• ofwhis/1. A, S, SF  l  16.4 I  S.S I  6.71  4os.J I  7.11  9.s I  349.4 I  9.al 
(I)  In 1990,the Community committed in favour ofHunpry an additionall70 MECU loan which is not tak1n into consideration in this table 
since it took place outside the 0·24 process. 
Source:  European Commission 
• 
%of 
dis b. 
71.1 
IS.? 
10.1 
2.4 
100.0 
ul 8 
Table 3: Balance of payments support to recipients ofEU 
macro-financial assistance by contributor, 1990-1996 (1) 
(in percent of total commitments) 
lncludjn~ debt relief 
1990  1991  1992 
IFI's  21  50  69 
IMF  1  I  37  40 
World Bank  10  13  29 
Bilaterals  79  50  31 
EU (2)  54  20  19 
Other bilaterals (3)  25  13  13 
of  which 
USA  0 
Japan  10  8  5 
Debt relief  18 
Paris Club  5 
London Club 
Other (4)  13 
Excludin~: debt relief 
1994 
27 
21 
6 
73 
6 
5 
I 
2 
63 
32 
28 
2 
1990  1991  1992  -1994 
IFI's  21  61  69  71 
IMF  II  45  40  56 
World Bank  10  16  29  15 
Bilaterals  79  39  31  29 
EU (2)  54  24  19  17 
Other bilaterals (3)  25  15  13  12 
of which 
USA  0  2 
Japan  10  9  5  6 
( 1)  Based on Council Decisions for  EU operations. 
No operation was decided in  1993. 
(2)  EU macro-financial assistance. 
(3)  Including EU Member States. 
(  4)  Syndicated comm_ercial banks loan in favour of Algeria in  1991, 
debt relief in favour of Ukraine by Russia and Turkmenistan in  1994 and in  1995, 
debt rescheduling in favou( of Moldova by Russia in  1996. 
1995  1996 
33  79 
26  62 
7  17 
67  21 
6  6 
3  3 
3.  , 
·3 
59  12 
59  12 
1995  1996 
80  90 
63 - 70 
17  20 
20  10 
14  7 
6  4 
4 
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EU 
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Table 4: Selected eeonomlc lndlcaton 
1993  1994  1995  1996 
Programme  <!)  Estimates 
GOP at con1tant prlce1  (Percent change) 
Albania  9.6  9.4  8.9  8.2 
Algeria  -2.2  -0.9  3.9  ..  4.2  4.0 
Belarus  -11.6  -20.0  -7.0  2.6 
Bulgaria  -I.S  1.8  2.1  -10.9 
Estonia  -8.5  -1.8  4.3  3.1  4.0 
Latvia  -16.0  2.0  -0.8  2.0  2.8 
Lithuania  -16.2  1.0  3.0  l.6 
Moldova  -8.7  -31.0  -3.0  4.0  I' -8.0 
Romania  1.S  3.9  7.1  4.0  4.1 
Ukraine  -17.1  -23.0  -12.0  -8,0  -10.0 
Con1umer price (end year)  (Percent change) 
Albania  30.9  15.8  6.0  17.4 
Algeria  16.1  38.6  21.9  15.0  15.1 
Belarus  1990.0  2220.0  290.0  39.0 
Bulgaria  63.8  122.0  32.9  310.8 
Estonia  35.6  41.7  28.9  23.7  14.8 
Latvia  35.0  26.0  23.0  16.0  13.0 
Lithuania  163.0  72.2  35.7  13.1 
Moldova  837.0  116.0  24.0  15.0  26.5 
Romania  295.0  61.7  27.8  19.0  56.9 
Ukraine  10155.0  401.0  182.0  47.0  39.7 
Fiscal balance  (Percent ofGDP) 
Albania  -14.4  -12.4  -10.4  -11.4 
Algeria  -8.7  -4.4  -1.4  0.3  3.0 
I 
-8.3  -1.7  -3.2  Belarus  1.9 
Bulgaria  -10.9  -5.8  -5.7  -11.0 
Estonia  -0.7  1.3  --1.2  -1.4  -1.5 
Latvia  0.6  -4.1  -4.4  -1.8  -1.2 
Lithuania  -5.1  -1.7  -1.8  -2.5 
Moldova  -6.8  -9.0  -5.5  -3 .. 4  -7.2 
Romania  -0.4  -1.9  -2.6  -2.2  -3.9 
Ukraine  -10.1  -8.2  -5.0  -3.0  -3.2 13 
Tab1e 4: S.leeted economic: lndluton (continued) 
1993  1994  199S  1996 
Propmme  (I)  Estimates 
Current account  (Percent of  GOP) 
Albania  -29.7  ·14.3  ·1.S  -7.7 
Algeria  1.6  -4.4  -5.3  -4.7  2.8 
Belarus  -8.7  ·11.4  -4.1  -4.3  -9.0 
s'ulgaria  -12.8  -2.1  -0.5  0.0 
Estonia  1.3  -7.1  -S.1  -6.9  ·10.2 
Latvia  6.7  -4.6  -4.0  -4.4  -6.8 
Lithuania  -6.2  -2.1  -10.3  ·8.2 
Moldova  -9.3  -9.2  -6.7  -6.8  -14.4 
Romania  -4.7'  -1.7  -4.9  -3.2  /-6,6 
Ukraine  -5.9  -6.0  -5.0  -3.8  -3.9 
omclal foreign exchanae reserves  (Months of imports) 
(end year) 
Albania  2.3  3.2  3.5  3.2 
Algeria  2.3  2.9  2.1  2.5  4.5 
Belarus  0.3  0.3  0.7  na  na 
Bulgaria  2.0  3.0  2.8  1.6 
Estonia  4.0  1.2  2.7  2.7  2.4 
Latvia  5.6  5.5  4.8  3.1  2.9 
Lithuania  2.4  3.1  3.9  2.4 
Moldova  l.S  3.1  4.0  3.4  4.0 
Romania  0.1  1.1  0.4  1.0  0.6 
Ukraine  0.2  2.3  3.7  1.2  1.3 
(I)  Programme targets as set in: June 96 for Algeria, September 1995 for Belarus, July 96 for Estonia, 
April 96 for Latvia, May 96 for Moldova, December 9S for Romania, May 96 for Ukraine. 
Sources: National authorities and IMF 1. 
2. 
~. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Price liberalization 
Trade liberali.zation 
Exchange regime 
Foreign direct investment 
Monetary policy 
Public finances 
Privatization and enterprise 
restructuring 
Financial sector refonn 
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ALBANIA 
Prices  mostly  market-detennined,  with  the  exception  of 
medicines  and  some  publicly  provided  goods  and  services 
(health care, urban transport, rail, eQergy arid water). 
No  quantitative  restrictions  on  imports.  Export  restrictions 
limited  to  scrap  metal  and  unprocessed  wood.  Removal  of 
tariff exemptions, new classification, new tariff rates approved 
in May 1995. Average tariff rate about 12%. Lower tariffs for 
some  capital  goods.  Request  for  accession  to  WTO  still  at 
early stage. 
Since July  1992  free  float  within a  unified  exchange market. 
Exchange system largely free of restrictions on current account 
transactions,  including profit repatriation.  Controls  remain on 
some capital transactions 
Liberal  legislation.  Sale of land  to  foreigners  penmtted,  but 
owing  to  delays  in  land  registration  process  no  sale  of 
agricultural land. Economic free zones set up. 
Bank-by-bank credit ceilings.  Banks free  to detennine lending 
rates,  but central  bank sets  minimum  deposit rates  to ensure 
that real  interest rates  remain positive.  Treasury bill  auctions 
(3. 6.  12 months). 
VAT introduced in  July  1996.  Budgetary revenue estimated ~t 
19% ofGDP in  1996: expenditure estimated at 29.4% of  GOP. 
96% of total arable land privatized.  Distribution of temporary 
titles  nearly  completed.  Small  privatization  in  trade  and 
services  completed.  Substantial  progress  in  privatization  of 
small and medium-sized industrial enterprises. Privatization of 
large  state-owned  enterprises  ·slower.  Strategic  enterprises 
offered  for  sale  to  foreign  investors.  Voucher-based  mass 
privatization  progranune  launched  in  mid-1995  aimed  at 
privatizing 400 medium-sized or large enterprises by end-1998. 
Only 97 enterprises sold by July 1996 because of difficulties in 
implementation  (including  vouchers  issued  at  too  high  a 
nominal value).  Stock exchange set up in  March 1996; trading 
so far limited to Treasury bills and privatization vouchers. 
Two-tier banking system dominated  by three large inefficient 
state-owned banks. Bad loans account for more than one-third 
of  all credit. With a view to privatizing two state-owned banks, 
in  December  1996  the  government  transferred  28  of their 
branches to the third one. 
Inefficient banking system caused infonnal financial  market to 
expand.  Several  pyramid schemes, offering very high  interest 
rates, collapsed late 1996. I.  Price liberalization 
2.  Trade liberalization 
3.  Exchange regime 
4.  Foreign dirl!ct investment 
5.  Monetary policy 
6.  Public finances 
15 
ALGERIA 
Price  liberalization  almost  completed  with  abolition  of 
generalized  food  subsidies,  including  the  most  sensitive 
products  (powdered  milk,  semolina,  and  regular  flour). 
Controls remain on  profit margins and prices of medicine and 
energy products, though prices for gas and electricity gradually 
adjusted  in  1996  with  a  view  to  covering  economic  cost by 
end-1997.  Competition Law adopted  in  1995  institutionalized 
principle  of  free  pricing,  provided  safeguards  against 
monopolistic  practices  and  obliged  all  suppliers  to  publish 
pnces. 
Reforms  initiated  in  1994  were  further strengthened.  At  end-
1996,  no  import  restrictions  (except  for  goods  permanently 
banned  for  social  and  religious  reasons).  Maximum  impon 
/ 
tariff lowered from 60% to 50% in January 1996.  ·-
Some restrictions on availability of foreign exchange for some 
current  invisible  payments  and  for  remittances  by  non-
residents. Government made clear its intention to introduce full 
currerit  account  convertibility  by  cnd-1997.  Managed  float 
regime  further  enhanced  following  establishment  of  fully 
fledged interbank foreign exchange market in December 1995. 
Liberal  foreign  investment  regime.  including  banking  sector, 
but  apart  from  hydrocarbon  sector,  no  significant  foreign 
investments have taken place owing to the security situation. 
Deregulation of interest rates,  including elimination of cap on 
banks' spreads,  in  December  1995,  together with deceleration 
of inflation, allowed positive real interest rates to emerge from 
begiMing  of 1996.  Use  of indirect  instruments  of monetary 
control  further  strengthened  with  a  view  to  facilitating 
development of  open-market operations by cent~al bank. 
Continued  strong  fiscal  management,  including  wage 
containment and tight policies on transfers and subsidies. 
7.  Privatization and enterprise  Privatization  Law  enacted  in  1996.  First 
restructuring  privatization/liquidation  progranune  covering  274  small 
enterprises launched.  Implementation  constrained  by  need  to 
restructure  loss-making  companies,  strong  social  resistance 
and some technical and legal delays.  Law allowing sale of all 
state-o\\ned agricultural land adopted in  1996. 
8.  Financial sector reform 
Public  enterprise  restructuring  made  further  progress,  in 
particular for the 23  largest loss-making enterprises. All public 
enterprises subject to hard budget constraints. 
Commercial  banks  ~)most exclusively  s•ate-owned.  In  1996, 
authorities launched  overhaul  of c~nunercial banks'  practices 
aimed at establishing greater autonomy in credit allocation and 
implementing new prudential regulations. As a result, all banks 
improved their capital/risk weighted ratio. 1.  Price liberalization 
2.  Trade liberalization 
3. 
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6. 
7. 
8. 
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BELARUS 
First price liberalisation in  1993.  Most prices (except for state 
monopolies) freed by end-1994/early 1995. Phased increases of 
public utilities prices up to 80% of  cost-recovery levels delayed 
to mid-1997.  Price  ceilings  administered  by local  authorities 
introduced  for  a  number of products  (bread,  dairy  products, 
baby  food,  etc.)  in  mid-1996.  Central  authorities  (directly) 
control the price of alcohol; profit margins for agriculture are 
regulated. 
Most  import  licences  and  export  taxes  ·abolished  in  1994. 
Requi~::ements  for  exporters  to  surrender  foreign  exchange 
reintroduced in early 1996, as well as a  10% tax on pur~hases 
of  foreign exchange.  .r 
Customs union with Russia entered into force early 1995. As a 
result,  import  taxes  rose  to  level  of Russian  ex'temal  tariff. 
Ratification of Partnership and  Co-operation Agreement  with 
the European Union on hold. 
Left Russian rouble zone in  1994. Only partial current account 
convertibility. Limitations on inter-bank currency operations. 
Free  repatriation  of capital  and  profits.  Owing  to  political 
uncertainties, flows of foreign direct investment almost zero. 
Two-tier banking  system.  Central  Bank  determines  monetary 
policy.  Since  second  half of  1996,  expansionary  monetary 
policy. Weekly auctions for a large share (60%) of credits to 
the banking sector. Mounting inflationary pressures. 
Introduction  of VAT  in  1993.  General  government  budget 
showed small ( 1.9%) deficit in  1996, but quasi-fiscal activities 
and arrears not properly accounted for. 
Slow  and  delayed  privatization  process.  Only  I 0% of state 
assets  privatized  by  end  1996.  Mass  privatization  cancelled 
despite free distribution of  vouchers to the population. 
A large share of  the banking sector privately owned.  Prudential 
regulations  progressively  tightened,  mm1mnm  capital 
requirement recently increased to 2 million FCU. Banks remain 
burdened  with  bad  loans,  which  weaken  their  financial 
position. 17 
BULGARIA 
1.  Price liberalization  Systems  of control  or monitoring  of approximately  50%  of 
goods  (weilhted by their  share  in  the  consumer  price  index) 
remained in force up to end-1996. 
2.  Trade liberalization  The regime is generally liberal, though an import surcharge at 
a rate of  5% was imposed in mid-1996. 
3.  Exchange regime  A  unified  and  quasi-free  flOating  exchange  regime  was 
introduced  in  1991.  This  has  been  subject  intermittently  to 
substantial intervention by the central bank trying to defend the 
currency. 
4.  Foreign direct investment  Liberal foreign investment legislation was adopted in  1992, but 
was partly tightened in late 1996. 
5.  Monetary policy  Although nominally independent,  the central  bank has  had  on 
occasion to provide considerable volumes of  direct c_r.edit to the 
budget. 
6.  Public finances  In  common  with  the  economy  as  a  whole,  public  finances 
suffered  a severe  crisis  in  1996.  as  the  deficit  reached  over 
10%  of GOP  owing  to  the  burden  .of interest  payments  on 
domestic  and  foreign  debt.  A  large  primary  balance  was, 
howe\'er,  recorded.  Tax  collection  is  poor,  and  a  reform  of 
taxation is  pl0ll111cd. 
7.  Privatization and enterprise  A· mass  (voucher)  privatization  progranwe got  under  way  in 
restructuring  1996.  Enterprise  restructuring  ~ccelerated some\vhat  as  the 
government initiated action to deal with the largest loss-making 
state enterprises. 
8.  Financial sector reform  Approximately one-third of  the banks were closed in  1996. The 
sector  is  now  dominated  by  5  state-owned  banks.  Banking 
supervision remains poor. 1. 
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ESTONIA 
Major price liberalization in  1991.  At end of 1996, remaining 
price controls  affected  land  and  forestry,  oil  shale,  medicines 
and utilities.  Prices of a limited number of services (e.g., rents 
and public transport) controlled at municipal level. 
No import duties, except for a very limited number of  products 
·(furs,  sea- and  snow-scooters,  and  small  vessels).  Export 
quotas/Jicences  for  clay  and  gravel.  Flat  fee  of EEK  200 
charged  per  import  and  export  declaration.  Free  trade 
agreement with EU in  for~ since  I January 1995.  Estonia has 
free trade agreements with the EFT A countries and with Latvia 
and  Lithuania  (since  1 April  1996).  Estonia  has  applied  for 
membez:ship of  the Central European Free Trade Agreement. 
Full current account convertibility. Kroon pegged to OM since 
1992  (lDM=8EEK)  under  a currency  board  regime,  with  a 
technical fluctuation limit of  3 per cent. 
Non-residents  may  freely  repatriate  profits  and  proceeds  of 
liquidation of  investment. 
Central Bank responsible for operating currency board and,  in 
exceptional  cases,  for  emergency  lending  to  the  banking 
system. Inflation fell  in  1996 to 14.8% (year-end figure). 
Tax reform  completed  by early  1994.  Indirect taxes  (VAT  in 
particular) represent  more  than  50% of government  revenues. 
Excise taxes raised in  1996. General government expenditures 
represented 42% ofGDP. 
Small-scale  privatization  virtually  completed.  At  the  end  of 
1996,  more  than  450  of the  500  medium-sized  and  large 
companies had been privatized. 
Two-tier banking system.  Consolidation of the  banking sector 
continued: at the end of 1996, there were  15 commercial banks. 
The Tallinn stock exchange was successfully launched in  1996 
and volumes have increased steadily. 1. 
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LATVIA 
By  end-1992,  price  liberalization  essentially  completed, 
excluding utility prices and rents.  In  1996, there was continued 
progress  in  bringing  the  remaining  regulated  prices  into  line 
with world prices. 
All trade restrictions abolished in  1992.  Free trade agreements 
with EU, Baltic States and EFT  A countries. Latvia has applied 
for WTO membership. 
Left  ~ouble  zone  in  July  1992.  Full  current  account 
convertibility.  Exchange rate of lats stabilized under managed 
floating system, informally pegged to the SDR. 
Non-residents  may  freely  repatriate  profits  and  proceeds  of 
liquidation of investment.  Substantial  flows  of foreign  direct 
investment (US$  171 million in 1996). 
/ 
IndePendent  central  bank.  Credi.t  policy  conductect  through 
indirect instruments. Interest rates fully liberalized. 
VAT introduced in February 1992. Flat rate inco,ne tax (2S%) 
plus  a  10% surcharge on  annual  income  introduced  in  1993. 
Tight control of public finances  in  1996; budget deficit turned 
out lower than expected. 
Latvian  Privatization Agency  set  up  in  February  1996  and 
procedures for privatization made more transparent and quick. 
Sell-off of Latvian energy supplier and shipping company well 
under way by end of 1996. 
Two-tier  banking  system  set  up  in  1992.  Banking  crisis  in 
1995  reduced  number of banks  to  33,  of which only  16  can 
accept household  deposits.  75% of banking  sector  in  private 
hands,  of which  39% in  foreign  ownership.  Capital  of state-
owned  banks  strengthened  in  preparation  for  privatization. 
Stock exchange started to operate in July 1995. I.  Price liberalization 
2.  Trade liberalization 
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LITHUANIA 
Almost all prices were fully liberalized during  1991-92. Some 
restrictions  remain  on  utility,  housing  and  transport  prices. 
Progress towards cost-recovery levels for energy prices. 
Relatively  liberal  trade  regime.  All  non-tariff  restrictions 
removed during  1991-92. Trade-weighted average tariff below 
5%  by  1995,  with  majority  of products  zero-rated.  Trade 
policies not always implemented as announced, notably tariffs 
on  some  agricultural  products,  which  have been  reduced  by 
less  than  envisaged  in  the  lMF  programme.  Free  Trade 
Agreement with E  U entered into force on 1 January 199 5 . 
Full  current account and  internal  convertibility.  Virtually  no 
restrictions on capital transactions. Left rouble zone in.Spring 
1992.  Currency board regime  established  in  April J994 with 
the litas "egged to the us dollar at a rate of  four to one .. 
Non-resider.ts  may  freely  expatriate  profits  and  proceeds  of 
liquidation of investment.  Foreigners allowed to own land for 
business  purposes  since  1996,  thanks  to  a  constitutional 
amendment. 
Since April  1994, monetary policy dictated by curre(\cy board 
arrangement  requiring  full  foreign  exchange  coverage  for 
reserve  money  and  other  litas-denominated  liabilities  of the 
Bank of Lithuania. 
Monetary  financing  of the  budget  deficit  precluded  by  the 
currency board arrangement.  Reform intended to make the tax 
system  better  suited  to  a  market  economy  has  been  largely 
accomplished  (including  introduction  of VAT).  Tax evasion 
and erosion of the  tax base have led  to substantial decline  in 
fiscal  revenue  as  percentage  of GOP.  Nevertheless,  budget 
deficits  have  remained  rather  small,  thanks  to  strict 
management of  expenditures. 
First  stage  of voucher  privatization  concluded  in  1995  with 
privatization of 85% of eligible  candidates.  Second  stage of 
privatization initiated in  1996: envisages cash sales to domestic 
and foreign buyers. 
Two-tier banking system established in  1992. Central bank and 
commercial banking act enacted in early 1995. Financial sector 
now recovering from  banking crisis of late  1995. Government 
actively pursuing three-pronged policy based upon: clean-up of 
the troubled banks' balance-sheets; privatization; strengthening 
of the  regulatory  framework  (tightening  of exposure  and 
capital  adequacy  rules,  adoption  of international  accounting 
standards and mandatory auditing).  Foreign banks allowed to · 
establish subsidiaries. Stock market in place. 1. 
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MOLDOVA 
_- Priees  of goods  and  services  fully  liberalized  wjth  some 
exceptions (mainly energy products). 
.All export quotas  removed.  Maximum  import tariff of 20%, 
with a few exceptions. 
New currency introduced  in November  1993.  Managed float, 
with  slow  nominal  depreciation  against  USD.  Daily  foreign 
exchange auctions at the Chisinau Inter-bank Foreign Currency 
Exchange. Curi'cnt account convertibility. 
Liberal  regime:  free  repatriation  of profits  and  proceeds  of 
. liquidation  of investments  within  three  months  of closure. 
Agency · for  Foreign  investment  Promotion  established  in 
·January  1995.  Partnership  and  co-operation  agreement  with 
EU signed in November 1994.  " 
Relics on credit ceilings.  Policy geared to further reduction of 
inflation,  enforced  financial  discipline  ara:t  enhanced  central 
bank independence. 
VAT  introduced  in  1992.  Tax  administration  improved. 
Privatization receipts far below expectations, because of  a lack 
of domestic  capital.  On  expenditure  side,  overruns  resulted 
from  higher-than-programmed  social  spending  and  from  net 
lending by the government, which assumed guaranteed loans to 
enterprises in default. 
2200  enterprises,  representing:  about  70%  of the  economy, 
privatized through the voucher progranune.  Mass privatization 
process concluded in October 1996.  Privatization for cash not 
successful, because of  a lack of  domestic capital. 
Two-tier  banking  system.  National  Bank  responsible  for 
monetary  policy  and  bank  supervision.  Regulation  imposing 
provisions  for  bad  loans  approved  in  1995.  From  1 January 
1996,  banks  with  reserve  level  below  Mdl  4 million  (about 
US$ 900,000) forced to close or to merge with a larger bank. 1. 
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ROMANIA 
Phased programme of  price liberalization introduced at the end 
of 1990. In  1993, most consumer subsidies eliminated and the 
number of consumer goods under direct price control greatly 
reduced. 
Liberalization of foreign trade regime largely completed by the 
end of 1992, though in  1995, around half of  Romania's imports 
were  subject  to  special  arrangements.  Substantial  trade 
restrictions  were  introduced  in  1996  in  an  attempt  to  curb 
rising trade deficit. 
Almost  full  current  account  convertibility.  Remaining 
restrictions concern maximum amounts that residents may take 
out of the country. In early 1996, significant controls impos~ 
on  enterprises·  and  banks'  foreign  exchange _,operations~ 
number  of banks  licensed  to  operate  on  foreign  ~xchange 
market restricted to four. 
FDI  and portfolio  investment regulated by  Jaw.  FDI  inflows 
dropped in  1996 and are small for the size of  the country 
National Bank is independent, though in  1996 it contributed to 
budget deficit financing and extended directed credits to state-
0\med enterprises and agricultural sector. 
Basic tax reform completed.  VAT and wage tax main sources 
of  government revenue.  Budget deficit soared in  1996, because 
of increase in subsidies. 
Little progress on restructuring of inefficient and large energy-
intensive enterprises, in particular because of overvaluation of 
exchange rate and low energy prices. By October 57% of small 
enterprises privatized,  but privatization of large and medium-
sized enterprises progressed slowly. 
Two large  private  banks  collapsed  in  1996.  Limited  deposit 
insurance  scheme  introduced  in  August  1996.  In  1996, 
secondary OTC market (RASDAQ) launched successfully. 1.  Price liberalization 
2.  Trade liberalization 
3. 
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UKRAINE 
Limits  set  by  local  governments  on  profit  margins  for  bread 
and oil products abolished in May  1996. Most goods no longer 
subject to price declaration  (only  energy and transport prices 
have to be declared). Increases for households in prices of  coal, 
electricity, gas and transport, but still below full cost recovery. 
Also, increases in rents. 
System  of  state  orderS  abolished,  except  for  grain  for 
budptary reasons. Budget allocations for state procurement of 
agricultural  products  limited  to  needs  of  budgetary 
organizations and based on market-detetl'';"!:d prices. 
Import  regime  free  of quantitative  restrictions,  with  few 
exceptions, which are primarily for health and safety reasons. 
Maximum  import  tariff 30%.  No  export  quotas  and  licences 
(except  for  hides  and  skins).  Partnership  and  CoOperation 
Agreement with EU signed June 1994. 
Exchange rate detennined at interbank auction market. 
Tax  relief  granted  to  some  foreign  direct  investments 
constituting at least 20% of  an enterprise's charter capital. This 
relief  was  granted  by  a  1993  decree  and  provided  for 
exemption from income and profit tax for 5 years. 
Central  bank  credit  to  commercial  banks  allocated  mostly 
through the  Lombard  facility,  and  to  a lesser extent through 
auction.  Directed  credits  no  longer  issued.  Central  Bank 
refinance rate adjusted to ensure that it remains positive in real 
tenns. 
Since  1992 gradual  tightening  and  rationalization  of budget, 
includina  refprm  of. VAT,  enterprise  and  income  taxes. 
Reduction of public expenditure from  72% of  GOP in  1992 to 
some 40% in 1996. Ratio revenue/GOP: 37% in 1996. 
Mass voucher privatization programme launched at  begiMing 
of 1995.  By end-1996,  about  80%  of small  enterprises  and 
SO%  of  medium-sized  and  large  eni.~rprises  had  been 
privatized.  Coal  sector  reform  programme  implemented  with 
the help of  the World Bank. 
Measures  to  strengthen  supervision  and  regulation  of the 
banking sector implemented. 24 
LALBANIA 
1.  Introduction 
Albania's macroeconomic and structural adjustment efforts were initiated in  1992 against 
a backdrop of  severe economic, social and administrative deficiencies. The ·country made 
considerable progress towards  macroeconomic  stabilization,  supported  by  an  SOR  20 
million stand-by arrangement from the IMF, complementary assistance from the EC in the 
form of  an ECU 70 million grantS and  bilateral assistance from G-24 members. 
Following the IMF's decision to back Albania's  medium-term  programme of structural 
reforms with a SOR 42.4 million Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility for the period 
from mid-1993  to mid-1996,  the Council of the European Unian decided  in  November 
1994 to grant the country renewed macro-financial assistance up to a maximum amount of 
ECU 3  5 million6. 
Performance from .1993  until  mid-1995  was satisfactory:  yearly  GOP growth ave.,ged 
9%,  tight budgetary and monetary policies were implemented,  external imbalances· were 
reduced, foreign reserves were built up to the equivalent of over 3 months • imports and 
structural reforms progressed. Subsequently,  however, the pace of reform slowed down 
·and important budgetary policy slippages appeared,  which  were only  partially corrected 
after the May 1996 general elections. 
2.  Macroeconomic performance 
In  1996,  real  GOP  grew  by  8.2  %,  continuing the  positive  performance  of the  three 
previous years. Agriculture, which accounts for over half of  GOP, grew 4. 5%, down from 
5.8% in  1995. For the second year in a row since the beginning of  the transition process, 
industrial  output  increased  slightly,  by  0.8%.  Production  in  state-owned  industries 
continued to fall,  while output in the newly established private enterprises in the  textiles 
and clothing  se~tor grew. According to official Albanian figures,  unemployment in  1996 
was 12.1%, down from 13% in  1995. 
Fiscal policy slackened in  1996, mainly because of the pre-electoral measures enacted in 
the first, months  of the year.  In  particular,  the agricultural  land  tax was  suspended,  tax 
collection was less vigorously enforced and  the introduction of the VAT to replace the 
turnover tax was delayed. Moreover, public sector wages were increased by 20% in April. 
However, soon after the elections the new government took a series of corrective fiscal 
measures.  On  1 July,  the VAT  was  introduced  and  exemptions  were limited  to bread, 
kerosene and bottled gas.  Price controls for  some food  staples (wheat, flour and  bread) 
were  removed.  In  October,  in  an  additional  effort  to  control  the  budget  deficit,  the 
gov~mment froze  spendi~g on  new  investment  projects.  The  reduction of expenditure 
from  the equivalent  of 30.8% of GOP  in  1995  to  29.4  %  in  1996,  was  nevertheless 
insufficient to offset a shortfall in revenue of 1  ~lo of  GOP in 1996, compared with 24% in 
1995, and the overall fiscal d'eficit for 1996 reached 11.4% of  GOP. 
6 
Council Decision of  28 September 1992 (92/482/EC). 
Council Decision of  28 November 1994 (94n73/EC). 25 
The pressures exerted by the fiscal  deficit and wage increases resulted in  faster inflation, 
reversing a downward trend 'that had begun in  1993. Consumer price inflation was 17.4% 
in 1996, up from 6% in  1995. Broad money growth was 40% in  1996.  .  . 
Imports increased substantially in  1996,  and  the trade deficit  rose to  25%-of GDP,  up 
from 19.6% of  GDP in  1995. The deterioration of the trade balance was, however, offset 
by the inflow of workers' remittances, which grew during the second half  of the year in 
response to  the  increasingly  high  returns  offered  in  the  informal  financial  sector.  The 
current account deficit remained relatively stable at 7.7% of  GOP (7.5% in  1995). Foreign 
exchange reserves grew to US$ 280 million (equivalent to 3.2 months' imports). 
The exchange rate against the dollar had been stable since the autumn of 1992. During the 
six months leading up  tQ  the 1996 general elections,  the lek  depreciated by  around  15% 
against major currencies, but during the second half of the year it  recovered most of the 
ground it  had  lost.  In  general,  the Bank of Albania  refrained  from  intervening,  except 
during brief  episodes of  high volatility. 
_, 
The  most -significant .  adverse  development  in  the  Albanian  economy  in  1996  wa."s  the 
increasing  instability  of the  expanding  informal  financial  sector.  The  sector  started  to 
develop from the very beginning of the transition process, spurred by the weakness of  the 
banking system and  the ensuing tight controls on bank credit.  Acting like deposit-takers 
-and operating de facto like pyramid schemes, the companies offered  higher interest rates 
than those offered  in  the banking  sector.  Until  the  end  of 1995,  monthly  interest  rates 
offered by these institutions were in the range of  4-5 %. However. in  1996 new companies 
began offering monthly rates v  .. ·hich  in  some cases exceeded 40%.  As  a result,  the larger 
incumbents also increased their rates and at the end of  the year they were offering monthly 
rates of 1  0%. 
Following warnings  from  the  IMF  in  October  1996,  the  government  started  to  voice 
doubts as to the soundness of  the savings schemes. In November and December 1996 two 
pyramid schemes collapsed. Despite redistribution to  investors of the frozen sums of the 
two collapsed schemes as partial compensation for losses,  turmoil escalated in  February 
1997 into a major political and security crisis.  Several more schemes were shut down. An 
existing  schemes  have  now  suspended  interest  payments  and  some  are  reimbursing 
principal, albeit on a piecemeal basis. 
3.  Structural reform 
Following considerable progress in  1994 and  1995, the pace of structural reform slowed 
down during 1996. Nevertheless some important measures were taken. 
Tax ·reform  progressed  thanks  to  the introduction of the  VAT  in  July.  However,  the 
system still  presents  a  number of weaknesses owing  to  a  high  number  of exemptions. 
Moreover, the tax administration needs to be substantially improved. 
Price liberalization was virtually  completed in  1996  and  controls  remained  only  on the 
prices of a  s·mall  number of goods and services (health care,  urban transport,  rail  fares, 
energy and water). Wheat and flour prices were decontrolled. The ceiling on the price of 
bread was removed (but special bread allowances were granted to government workers). 
Under the Mass Privatization Programme (MPP), the privatization of small and  medium-
sized  service  and  production  enterprises  was  actively  pursued  and  almost  completed. 26 
Some  30  larger  enterprises  were  also  sold.  For  the  large  enterprises  (mostly  mining 
companies and public utilities) the authorities decided to give priority to sales to strategic 
investors, reserving a minority for sale through the MPP.  The liquidation of some twenty 
enterprises that had  been transferred  to  the Enterprise Restructuring  Agency (ERA)  has 
also continued, albeit slowly. 
Some  steps were taken to  reform the banking system.  In  February  1996,  the Parliament 
adopted  two  laws  determining  the  role  and  responsibilities  of the  Bank  of Albania, 
including its  relations with  the government regarding the financing  of the budget deficit. 
Simultaneously,  the  law  on  the  banking  system  was  adopted,  streamlining  the  licensing 
procedures and  establishing the regulatory framework for banking activity.  However,  the 
regulations relating  to  the  Bank  of Albania  and  the  Banking  Law  were  not  adequately 
enforced.  Moreover,  the  regulatory  framework  for  financial  activity  in  Albania  remains 
seriously  inadequate.  Supervisory  regulations  that  accord  with  international  standards 
have yet to be developed. 
In  September  1996  the  government  announced  a strategy  to  privatize  Albania's. three 
state-owned  banks  within  three  years.  In  December  most  of the  branches  of the' Rural 
Commercial Bank and of the National  Commercial Bank were transferred to  the  Savings 
Bank,  which the government intends to  privatize last.  The Savings Bank was left free  to 
close down or restructure the branches. 
4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
The grant ofECU 35  million decided  by the Council  in November  1994 was disbursed  in 
two  tranches.  The  tirst tranche (ECU  15  million)  was  disbursed  in  May  1995,  following 
signature  of the  ~lemorandum of Understanding  laying  down  the  macroeconomic  and 
structural  conditions  attached  to  the  grant.  In  early  September  1996  the  Commission 
decided  to  disburse the second  tranche (ECU  20  million),  in  view of the measures taken 
by  the  new  Albanian  government  to  address  the  budgetary  imbalances,  including  the 
introduction  of the  VAT,  and  of the  progress  in  implementing  structural  reforms 
men~ioned in the Memorandum of Understanding. 27 
D. ALGERIA 
1.  ·Introduction 
In  1996,  Algeria  completed  an ·important  stage of the  economic  and  structural  reform 
prognnane  that  was  launched  in  the  early·  1990s.  The  programme  wu  aimed  at 
tr'llllfonlliDI  an  adminittratively  replated  economy  into  a· market  economy  with  a 
libentfind domestic price system and external trade and payments regimes. A strong track 
record of policy implementation and stabilization has been established,  despite mounting 
difficulties in the political and security situation. 
Positive real economic growth was restored, inflation declined towards a single-digit rate, 
tbe  cu~t-account and  fiscal  balances  turned  into  surpl~ses,  and  the  external  and 
domestic  debts  were  reduced.  This  performance  reflected  both  favourable  eX:ogenous 
developments,  in particular in the hydrocarbon and agriculture sectors,  and the continued 
steadful implementation  of· important institutional  reforms.  puring  1990-96,  domestic 
prices were liberalized. together with the trade and payment systems; the restructuring··of 
public eaterprises wu launched; a programme of privatization/liquidation of small-public 
enterpriles was  implemented;  the banking sector  was  deregulated;  and  a managed  float 
exchange rate regime and an interbank foreign exchange marlcet were introduceci. On the 
social front, housing reforms were initiated and the social safety net was modernized. 
Algeria's economic and structural reform programme continued td ·receive strong financial 
support from  the  Bretton Woods  institutions. ·Following  two  stand-by  arrangements,  in 
1991  and  1994.  the  I:MF  approved  a three-year  Extended  Fund  Facility  (EFF)  in  May 
1995  for  a  total  amount  of SDR  1,169  million.  Algeria  has  met  all  the  quarterly 
performance criteria set under the EFF since its inception.  In addition,  in June  1996, the 
IMF &pfi'OVed a purchase under the Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility on 
account of  excess cereal import costs. The World Bank approved a Structural Adjustment 
Loan (SAL) of USS 100 million in support of a private sector development programme in 
April  1996. The first tranche of US$  150 million was disbursed in June  1996. Reforms of 
the social safety r:tet were also supported by a US$  SO million loan. 
The Community also supported Algeria's reform process. The Council decided in  1991  to 
grant  Algeria a first  loan of ECU 400 million'.  which was disbursed  in  1992 (ECU  250 
million) and  1994  (ECU  I  SO  million).  In  1994,  following  a request  for  further  macro-
financial  assi-stance  from  the  Algerian authorities,  the Council  adopted  a second  macro-
financial  operation  (up  to  ECU  200 million)  to  be  disbursed  in  two  tranches 11•  A first 
tranche (ECU  100 million) was released in November 1995. 
2.  Macro-economic performance 
The recovery in output growth registered in  1995 was sustained in  1996, when real  GOP 
rose by 4 per cent.  The overall contraction of domestic demand was more than offset by 
the explnSion of the export sector. Agriculture, the hydrocarbon sector, construction, and 
public  works  were  the  main  engines  of growth.  By  contrast,  industrial  production 
continued to  decline,  by  about 4 per cent  in  real  terms,  reflecting the  poor productivity 
7  Cotu.cil Decision 91/S 1  0/EEC. 
Council Decision 94/938/EEC. 28 
and tightened credit constraints in the large public enterprise sector.  Despite the rebound 
in economic activity, the unemployment rate continued to increase in  1996 to reach 28.3 
per  cent. at  end-year,  as  economic  growth  was  not  sufficient  to  generate  enough 
employment opportunities. 
The pursuit of a tight monetary  policy  resulted  in  a further  decline  of the  inflation  rate 
(December-on-December), from 21.9 per cent in  1995 to  15.1  per cent in  1996. Since the 
central  bank  repurchase rate was  reduced  by  2 percentage  points  to  20%,  real  interest 
rates  became  positive.  In  addition,  bank  credits  to  the  less  productive  sectors  of the 
economy, such as the food  importing agencies and  some public enterprises,  were curbed 
so  as  to  make  room  for  more  profitable  and  productive  investments.  The  inflation 
performance was also facilitated  by a good  harvest,  a moderate increase in  administered 
prices, and a small appreciation C'fthe real effective exchange rate of  the dinar. 
Higher  international  oil  prices  and  strong  fiscal  management  resulted  in  an  exceptional 
fiscal  performance in  1996.  The overall fiscal  balance reached a surplus of 3 per cent. of 
GOP, .a turnaround  equivalent  to  7.4  and  4.4  per cent  of GOP  compared  to  199_4  and 
1995,  respectively.  While non-hydrocarbon receipts remained  unchanged as a proportion 
of  .GOP,  hydrocarbon receipts increased  by about  2 percentage  points  of GOP  in  1996. 
On the expenditure side, wage containment and  continued tight' policies on transfers and 
subsidies allowed for a reduction in current expenditure (as a ratio to GOP) for the third 
consecutive year.  As  a result  of sustained  fiscal  consolidation,  the  outstanding domestic 
debt was halved during the p'eriod  1993-96 to 22.2 per cent of  GOP. 
Algeria's  external  position  improved  considerab_ly  in  1996,  mainly  as  a  result  of the 
increase of the international crude oil  price by  USS  2 per barrel (corresponding to a 23.4 
per cent  increase  in  Algeria's crude  oil  export  unit  value).  The  current account  balance 
swung from  a deficit of US$  2.2 billion in  1995  to  a surplus of US$  1.2  billion  in  1996 
(2.8 per cent of GOP). Hydrocarbon exports, which represented more than 95  per cent of 
total Algerian exports, increased in value by about 30 per cent.to US$  12.6 billion.  Total 
imports,  at US$  9. 1 billion, declined by .1 0 per cent in the wake of the good harvest,  the 
overall  contraction  of domestic  demand,  and  the  recession  in  the  industrial  sector.  The 
capital account balance, though negative, improved by about 2.5  per cent of GOP,  owing 
in part to a pick-up in foreign direct investment  in the energy sector.  In addition,  Algeria 
continued to benefit from large exceptional financing in the form of public and commercial 
debt reschedulings.  As a result, gross foreign exchange reserves doubled  in  1996 to reach 
..  US$  4.2  billion  at  end-year,  equivalent  to  4.5  months'  imports.  Algeria's  outstanding 
external debt declined slightly to 74.2 per cent of  GOP at end-1996. 
3.  Structural reforms 
In  11996, the process of liberalizing the economy and establishing market mechanisms was 
further  consolidated,  except  for  the  restructuring  and  privatization  of large  public 
enterprises, where the social consensus needed to underpin the reforms was more difficult 
to sustain in view of  rising unemployment and labour unrest. 
Domestic price liberalization was almost completed with  the abolition  of the generalized 
food  subsidies,  including those· on  the  most  sensitive  products,  such  as  powdered  milk, 
semolina,  and  regular  flour.  The  only  remaining  controls  on  profit  margins  and  prices 
applied  to  medicine  and  energy  products.  Prices  for  gas  and  electricity  were  gradually 
adjusted  in  1996  with  a view  to  covering  economic  cost  by  end-1997.  The  maximum 29 
import tariff was lowered from 60 per cent to SO  per cent in early 1996. As of end-1996, 
Algeria's trade system was free of import restrictions (except for  a  short list of goods 
permanently  banned  for  social  and  religious  reasons).  Some  restrictions  remained  on 
invisible current account transactions. 
Following  the  adoption  of  the  Privatization  Law,  a  first  privatization/liquidation 
programme covering  274  enterprises,  units  of enterprises,  and  activities  in  small-scale . 
industry,  commerce,  services,  construction,  and  transport  was  launched  in  April  1996. 
However, effective transfers to the private sector or liquidation were constrained by the 
need  to  restructure  loss-making  companies,  strong  social  resistance  to  the  inevitable 
redundancies  and  some  technical  and  legal  delays,  as  well  as  the  need  to  ensure 
transparency. An amendment to the Privatization Law was prepared in late 1996 in order 
to  increase  flexibility  in  privatization  procedures,  including  equity  participation  by 
employees, auctions and mass privatization, with a view to launching, in  1997, a second 
programme of privatization/liquidation  involving  some  larger  public  enterprises  in  the 
manufacturing  sector.  In  addition,  a  draft  law  allowing  the  sale  of all  state-owned 
agricultural land was adopted in 1996.  / 
The restructuring of  the large public enterprises made some progress, in particular for the 
23  largest  loss-making  companies  which  had  not  been  granted  legal  and  financial 
autonomy,  and  thus  remained  protected  against  bankruptcy.  By  end-1996,  in  the 
framework  of the  World  Bank's Enterprise  and  Financial  Structural  Adjustment  Loan 
approved in  1991 , one enterprise had  been liquidated and the other 22 had been granted 
autonomy  and  were  required  to  meet  performance  contracts  relating  to  restructuring 
measures. All public enterprises had been made subject to hard budget constraints. 
In  conjunction with the  restructuring of public  enterprises,  an  overhaul  of commercial 
banks' practices was implemented with the aim of introducing greater autonomy in  credit 
allocation and  applying  new  prudential  regulations  on  portfolio  concentration and  loan 
classification and provisioning.  As a result, all banks improved their capitaVrisk weighted 
ratio, which was expected to reach the BIS standard of  8 per cent by  1999. Other banking 
reforms included a further move towards indirect monetary controls and the esta.blishment 
of  a fully fledged interbank foreign exchange market. 
4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
In  1996,  discussions  took  place  between the  Algerian  authorities  and  the  Commission 
services  on  the  appropriateness of and  conditions  for  the  disbursement  of the  second 
tranche of the  1994 macro-financial loan (up to ECU  100  million).  However, agreement 
was not reached on the conditions attached to its release, in particular with respect to the 
calendar  for  the  implementation  of  a  programme  of privatization  of  large  public 
ent~rprises. Moreover, Algeria's residual financing gap vanished in  1996 as a result of the 
strong current account performance. In December 1996, the Commission decided, as part 
of  the MEDA programme, and after consulting the Member States9,  to support Algeria's 
structural  reform  programme  through  a  Structural  Adjustment  Facility  (SAF)  for  an 
amount of  ECU 125 million to be disbursed in two tranches of ECU 60 million and ECU 
65  million.  This  grant-based  assistance,  which  is  intended  to  complement  the  World 
Bank's  SAL,  will  be  disbursed  on  condition  that  specific  reforms  in  the  area  of 
9  In accordance with Council Regulation W  1488/96. 30 
international trade,  housing,  agriculture,  privatization of small  enterprises,  and  the social 
safety net are implemented. 31 
ID.BELARUS 
1.  Introduction 
Economic and political developments in Belarus were a matter of grave concern in  1996. 
The  moderate  progress  made  towards  stabilization  in  the  past  faltered:  inflation 
accelerated substantially in the last quaner, and the external sector was particularly fragile. 
The growth officially recorded  in  1996 appears  to  be  mostly  the result of state orders, 
which were financed by cheap credit from the banking system, and led to a major surge of 
stocks. State interference in the economy intensified. progress with structural reforms was 
minimal, and privatization was halted. 
In  1996 Belarus failed to meet the basic requirements for transition to a market economy, 
including:  a  well-defined  and  guaranteed  system  of property  rights;  and  legal  and 
administrative institutions to ensure that the rule of law is  enforced in  a transparent and 
coherent way.  Furthermore,  the  political  will  was  lacking to. make  concerted efforts  to 
proceed with the necessary democratic and economic reforms.  · 
Under those circumstances, the international financial  institutions intenupted all  major 
programmes of financial  usistance.  Since  1993,  multilateral  donors  had  assisted and 
en:couraged the reform process in Belarus. The IMF had intervened with two tranches of 
a Systemic Transformation Facility in July 1993 and in January 1995. The conclusion of 
a more ambitioUJ prosramzne in the form of  a stand-by  arran~ent, initially envisaged 
for  March  1995,  wu polfponed pending the  adoption  of the  government's economic 
programme for  1995/96. The IMP hoard eventually approved the stand-by arrangement 
on 12 September 1995. The Commission disbursed in December 1995 ECU 30 million of 
the  ECU  55  million  balance-of-payments assistance  approved  in support  of the  IMP 
stand-by arrangement. However, the IMF programme soon went off track.  The second 
tranche of the Community loan hu consequently not been disbursed,  and there are no 
plans to reactivate it. 
The resumption of international financial  assistance would  require  a major effort on  the 
part  of the  authorities  to  accomplish  an  effective  liberalization  of the  economy,  to 
accelerate structural reform, and to implement tight monetary and fiscal  policies,  so as to 
ensure that macroeconomic stabilization is sustained and the-efforts made so far,  entailing 
major social costs, are not wasted. Until those conditions are met, in line with the position 
of the CouncillO' the EU will encourage the international financial  institutiOnS to  maintain 
a  case-by-case  approach  to  new  lending  proposals,  observing  strict  economic 
conditionality. 
2. ·  Macroeconomic performance 
I 
The  economic  picture  which  emerges  from  the  official  statistics  is  quite  mixed.  GOP 
growth for  1996 is reported at 2.6% with respect to the previous year,  and  accelerating. 
The  increase  in  GOP  is  driven  by  major  increases  in  industrial  production.  ~owever, 
economic growth appears to be mostly the result of state orders, which were financed by 
cheap  credit  from  the  banking  system,  and  led  to  a  major  surge  of stocks.  A barter 
agreement with Russia all.owed the use of the stocks accumulated during  1996 to be used 
in payment for gas arrears to RAO Gazprom. 
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Moreover, there were clear signs that the moderate progress made towards stabilization i~ 
1995  and  in  the  first  half of 1996  were  in  jeopardy,  and  serious  threats  to  a  low..; 
inflationary environment surfaced. After a period of relative stability, inflation accelerated 
substantially in the last quarter of 1996. 
The situation of the external sector deteriorated markedly in  1996.  Imports surged as a 
result of  the extremely overvalued exchange rate and caused a sharp deterioration of the 
current account. The deficit increased from $370 million in  1995 to an estimated $1,220 
million, i.e., about 9% ofGDP, at the end of 1996. 
Economic policy in 1996 was erratic. Monetary policy~ relatively restrictive in the first half 
of the year,  suffered  a severe blow in  the  second  half  In April  President ·  Lukashenko 
placed the central bank under the authority of the president rather than the parliament. · 
This shift in supervisory powers, together with the suspension of multilateral lending and 
supervision  by  the IMF,  led  to a  rel.Xation  of monetary  policy,  and  money  emission 
increased by 64% over the full  year.  This expansionary monetary policy was  inconsist~t 
with the de facto  fJ?Ced  exchange rate regime,  as became very clear in the second h.!!lf of 
1996,  when  pressures increased  for  a sizeable  devaluation of the  exchange  rate ·of the 
rubel. 
Fiscal  policy,  at  least  on  paper,  remained  more  restrictive.  Officially,  the state budget 
recorded a modest deficit for 1996, equal to 1.9% of  GOP. However, this figure does not 
take  fully  into  accoul'\t  the  rapid  build-up  of arrears,  estimated  at  I%  of GOP;  the 
existence of quasi-fiscal activities; and  extra-budgetary funds.  Independent estimates put 
the deficit for  1996 at  about 4% of GOP.  Furthermore, the way in  which the deficit was 
financed had major negative consequences for the financial  stability of the country. In the 
second half of 1996, the government resorted increasingly to credits issued by the central 
bar,k. 
Exchange  rate  policy  was  arg~ably the  clearest  example  of reversal  in  the process of 
liberalization. At the beginning of 1995 the authorities decided to peg the rubel against the 
US  dollar with the aim  of helping to control inflation.  A sizeable real  appreciation and 
growing  expectations  of a  devaluation  imposed  a  major  drain  on the  reserves  of the 
central  bank.  From  November  1995,  the  authorities  resorted  to  a  succession  of 
administrative  controls,  which  included  the prohibition of inter-bank trading and  major 
restrictions on the purchase of foreign  currency.  In April  1996 the Inter-bank Currency 
Exchange was nationalized and  put  under the  direct  control of the central bank.  In  the 
mean  time,  the  fixed  rate  regime  was  replaced  by  a  currency  corridor.  The  corridor 
sharply  overvalued  the  rube!,  which  regularly  traded  at  a 30-50% discount  on  parallel 
markets.  This  prompted  the  authorities  to  introduce  further  administrative  controls, 
including a 10% tax on purchases of foreign exchange introduced in January  1996 and a 
reqairement  that  exporters  surrender  100%  of their  foreign  exchange  earnings.  Those 
measures, which were subject to frequent changes and  arbitrarily applied,  ied  de facto to 
the establishment of  a multiple exchange regime. 
3~  Structural reform 
The Belarus economy remained unreformed in many areas, and the state continued to play 
a major role in the production and distribution of goods. Indeed, the authorities' response 
to  growing financial  instability  was  to  increase  the  degree  of state  interference  in  the 33 
Liberalization suffered  some reversal,  both in  the case of the  exchange  rate,  and  in  the 
case of prices.  Most prices were liberalized  as  early  as  1992,  and  the  process of price 
liberalization  was  mostly  completed  at  the  beginning  of 1995.  The  central  authorities 
continued to control directly the price of alcohol,  while administered  prices were set for 
transport, energy and communications. Profit margins for agriculture were regulated.  On 
30 August,  1996  a presidential decree reintroduced direct  price ceilings administered  by 
the local authorities on a number of  products (bread, dairy products, baby food, etc.). 
Weak  commitment  in  the  areas  of privatization  and  enterprise  restructuring  virtually 
halted  ·the  structural  reform  process  from  1995.  Small-scale  privatization  has  been 
relatively successful,  the most noticeable progress being  made  in  the housing sector and 
retail  trade.  Large-scale  privatization  faltered.  During  1996  only  164  state-owned 
enterprises were transformed into joint-stock companies, compared with an original target 
of 549.  A voucher  scheme  for  mass  privatization  was  cancelled,  under  the  pretext  of 
rooting out tax evasion and corruption.  As a result only about  10% of Belarus' firms  are 
in private hands. 
/ 
4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
On  10  April  1995  the  Council  approved 11  Community  macro-financial  assistance  to 
Belarus in the form of  a I 0-year loan, conditional upon the conclusion of an IMF stand-by 
arrangement,  to  support  the  country's  programme  of macro-economic  adjustment  and 
structural reforms.  After approval in September 1995 by the IMF board of a first stand-by 
arrangement with Belarus, the Commission services visited Belarus to assess the economic 
and fmancial situation and  to  set terms and conditions for the Community macro-financial 
assistance. 
In  a  Memorandum  of Understanding  attached  to  the  Community  loan,  the  Belarus 
authorities undertook significant commitments in several areas of structural reform {price 
liberalizaticm, privatization, financial discipline of  enterprises, and banking reform), as well 
as compliance with the performance criteria foreseen in the IMF stand-by arrangement. 
The Community contribution was set at ECU  55  million on the basis of external financial 
needs estimated at  about $600 million over the period of the IMF  stand-by arrangement. 
The amount of the first tranche of the Community loan was set at ECU 30 million.  It was 
disbursed in December 1995. 
Given the lack of progress in  several areas of structural reform  and  the  reversal of some 
measures  of liberalization,  the  second  tranche  has  not  been  disbursed.  Furthermore,  all 
Community assistance to Belarus, except for a limited number ofT  ACIS actions,  has been 
suspended indefinitely. 
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IV. BULGARIA 
1.  Introduction 
In  1996,  Bulgaria  underwent  a  deep  economic  cnsts.  This  was  the  consequence  of 
inconsistent macroeconomic policies and  poor progress in  structural reform.  In the final 
days of  the year the economic crisis had political repercussions, as the Prime Minister Mr. 
Videnov resigned. 
Bulgaria started its transition to  a  market economy later and  under more unfavourable 
conditions  than  most  central  European  countries.  In  March  1990,  the  country  ha.d 
declared  a moratorium on the servicing of its foreign  currency debt,  effectively cutting 
itself off from international finance.  Bulgaria had  conducted a particularly large share of 
its foreign trade with the CMEA, and so was especially badly hit by its break-up. A further 
external shock came with the disintegration of  Yugoslavia and the subsequent embargo on 
Serbia-Montenegro, which cut Bulgaria's main overland transit route to western markets. 
Economic  reforms  were  launched  in  February  1991.  Prices  of  most  goods>'were 
liberalized,  subsidies  were  sharply  reduced,  a  unified  floating  exchange  rate  was 
introduced, a two-tier banking system was set up, and the state monopoly on foreign trade 
was abolished.  Good  progress was  made  also  in  establishing the legislative  basis for  a 
market economy: by mid-1992 much of  the legal framework was in place. 
However,  the  momentum  of  structural  reform  was  not  maintained.  Practical 
implementation did not match the progress made in  establishing the legal base of a market 
economy. Moreover, there were a number of reversals:  price controls were reintroduced 
on a wide range of goods. 
Clear political  support for  enterprise  restructuring  and  privatization  was  lacking.  State 
enterprises continued to face  "soft budget constraints",  and  were thus  able to  build  up 
large stocks of  bad debts with state-owned banks. These banks were in tum able to obtain 
uncollateralized  loans  from  the  central  bank.  The  central  bank's ability  to  refuse  such 
loans  was  constrained,  first  because  it  was  not  clear  that  it  had  the  powers  to  close 
commercial banks;  and  second because it  was unwilling to take the initiative of forcing 
widespread enterprise restructuring, which would have been the consequence of imposing 
restrictions on commercial banks' access to central bank credit. 
Excessively large budget deficits, financed in part directly by the central bank, contributed 
to persistent inflation, which the central bank tried to moderate by regular intervention in 
the foreign  exchange market to stabilize the exchange rate.  This  inconsistency between 
fiscal,  monetary  and  exchange  rate  policies  caused  exchange  rate·  tensions  whenever 
finapcial markets perceived that the central bank did not have adequate foreign reserves to 
continue supporting the currency.  While  the precise timing of these tensions,  in  Spring 
1994 and  again from  early  1996,  has been influenced  by  Bulgaria's external obligations, 
they were an inevitable consequence ofweaknesses in domestic policies. 
2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Following  the  signature of a  debt  and  debt-service  reduction  agreement  (DDSR)  with 
foreign commercial creditors in  July  1994,  Bulgaria enjoyed a period  of relatively good 
economic performance. Modest growth in GDP was recorded m 1994 and  1995.  By early 
1996  annual  inflation  had  fallen  to under 30%.  The  reduction  in  inflation  was  greatly 3S 
helped  by  the  remarkable.  stability  of the  exchange  rate  during  1995.  However,  the 
combination of a stable  exchange  rate  and  inflation  which,  although  slowing,  remained 
. high  relative  to  Bulgaria's  trade  partners  in  western  Europe,  resulted  in  a ·strong  real 
appreciation of the lev.  In the absence of any substantive structural reforms this led to a 
gradual weakening of  the country's balance of  payments from mid-1995. 
Developments  in  1996  clearly  revealed  that  Bulgaria's economic  recovery  in  1994  and 
1995  had  not been based  on  solid  foundations.  GOP  fell  by  over  I 0%.  December-on-
December inflation reached over 3000.4, reflecting a massive depreciation of  the currency. 
The. exchange rate fell  from approximately 70  leva per dollar at  the start of the year to 
almost SOO leva per dollar by the end of 1996. 
A3 awareness spread in the early months of 1996 that the central  bank's foreign reserves 
were  only  barely  adequate  to  meet  foreign  debt-service  payments,  the .lev  came  under 
increasing  pressure.  For  some  months,  the  central  bank  sought  to  attenuate  the 
depreciation  by  a combination  of interest  rate  increases  and  direct  intervention  in  the 
foreign  exchange  market.  This  merely  delayed  matters,  and  when  the  central /bank 
eventually withdrew from the market, its foreign currency reserves substantially depleted, 
a massive depreciation got under way.  This was temporarily  halted  in  the autumn when 
the central bank raised its monthly interest rate to  25%  (equivalent to an annual  rate of 
over 1  000%), but the central bank's scope to use interest rates as a means to support the 
lev was severely restricted by the effect of high interest rates on the real economy. 
4. 
Because of the  lack  of structural reform,  the banking  system  was  burdened with  a high 
proportion  of bad  debts  from  enterprises.  Raising 'interest  rates  in  these  circumstances 
· merely increased the share of loans which could not be repaid.  This further weakened the 
banking system:  the operations of some  15  banks  were  suspended  during  the  year.  The 
other main victim  of high  nominal  interest  rates  was  the  state budget.  Several  years  of 
unduly large budget deficits resulted in the state accumulating a·large domestic debt.  High 
interest rates raised the cost of  servicing this debt. 
For  these  reasons,  the  central  bank  lowered  interest  rates  after  a  few  weeks,  while 
maintaining them  at a relatively high level of 15%  per month.  This level  of interest rate, 
while  inadequate  to  support  the  lev,  still  added  to· the  burden  of interest  payments. 
Moreover,  tax revenues fell  as a result of the reduction  in economic activity.  During the 
second half of 1996, the government had to tum almost exclusively to the central bank to 
finance its rapidly widening budget deficit. The .-esultant increase in the money supply led 
to an acceleration both in the rate of  currency depreciation and in inflation. 
These  developments  reduced  the  dollar  value  of wages  and  pensions  to  extremely  low 
levels. Data on household income and expenditure for the first nine months of 1996 show 
how the fall  in  real income  affe~ted living standards.  The share of income spent on food 
increased  throughout  the  period,  accounting  for  over  half of household  purchases  in 
September.  While  people were spending relatively  more on food,  they were eating less: 
compan~d with  the  same  period  of 1995,  in  the  third  quarter  of 1996  per  capita 
consumption  of meat,  eggs,  fruit  and  vegetables  was  some  15%  lower;  only  milk  and 
potatoes were eaten in quantities little changed compared with  1995.  · 
Government attempts to reverse the slide and stabilize the economy during the second half 
of 1996  were largely unsuccessful.  A stand-by arrangement  with  the  IMF  ran  off track 
soon after it had been approved. Attempts to agree a revised economic programme were 36 
thwarted by a difficult political situation, following the victory of  the opposition candidate 
in  the  presidential  elections  in  November.  The  Prime  Minister  narrowly  survived  a 
subsequent no-confidence motion, but his position had been sufficiently weakened that he 
resigned, along with his government, at an extraordinary plenum of the Socialist Party in 
late December. 
The country was then effectively without  a government at a  critical  time.  No  credible 
budget could be adopted for  1997.  The opposition initiated a boycott of parliament, and 
called for immediate elections. There were daily protest marches in the capital Sofia and in 
other towns. The economic and social situation continued to deteriorate. Strikes and civil 
unrest  spread,  as  trade  .unions  called  for  weekly  pay  increases  and  for . monthly 
negotiations  on wage levels.  The situation was resolved  in  February  1997  when  early 
elections were called and an interim government was appointed. This had an immediately 
beneficial impact on both political and economic stability. 
3.  Structural reform 
/ 
The  authorities  attempted  to  relaunch  structural  reform  in  mid-1996.  This  was·'  at  the 
prompting  of the  Bretton  Woods  institutions,  which  insisted  on  such  measures  as  a 
condition of  their renewed support to Bulgaria. The authorities sought assistance from the 
IMF  and  World  Bank  following  unsuccessful  attempts  in  the  first  months  of 1996  to 
prevent a rapid exchange rate depreciation,  which had  eroded the central bank's foreign 
exchange reserves and raised the prospect that Bulgaria would default on its restructured 
foreign  debt.  A  degree  of success  was  achieved  in  liquidating  large  loss-making  state 
enterprises, and in  isolating from the banking system loss-making companies which could 
not  be  closed  down  (eg  utilities).  In  addition,  some  15  insolvent  banks  were  closed. 
However,  the  authorities  lacked  sufficient  credibility,  and  were  unable  to  arrest  the 
economic  downturn.  It was  not  until  there  was  a  change  of government  in  the  early 
months of 1997 that prospects of  economic stabilization and recovery emerged. 
4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
A first  macro-financial  loan of some ECU 290 miilion  to  Bulgaria was  decided by  the 
Council in  1991, 1 2 and disbursed in two instalments in  1991  and  1992. This loan is  to be 
repaid in December 1997 and March 1998. 
A further ECU 110 million  lo~n was approved  in  1992,13 but because of repeated policy 
slippages,  its disbursement was much delayed.  A first  instalment of ECU 70 million  was 
disbursed in  1994 in the framework of the stand-by arrangement agreed with the Il\1F  in 
May ofthat year. Disbursement ofthe outstanding ECU 40 million instalment did not take 
place until the second half of 1996, following the approval by the IMF of a new stand-by 
arr~ngement. 
Bulgaria is  currently  implementing  economic  reforms  with  the  support of a  new  IMF 
stand-by arrangement. The possibility of additional Community macro-financial lending is 
presently being examined. 
12  Council Decision 91/311/EEC of 24 June 1991. 
13  Council Decision 92/5 11/EEC of 19 October 1992. 37 
V. ESTONIA 
1.  Introduction 
After the sharp contraction of output which followed  independence,  economic recovery 
started in the·  second half of 1993. Revised data on the evolution of real GD P suggest that 
Estonia experienced fairly rapid improvement thereafter. For 1994, the decline of GOP is 
now estimated to have been only 1.8% compared to the earlier figure of  2. 7%. G(owth for 
1995 was revised upwards from 2:9% to 4.3%, and for  1996 the first  estimates show a 
4% real increase.  For the last quarter of 1996, real growth of GOP  is  estimated to have 
been 7.3%, a clear acceleration of  the trend observed in the second and third quarters. 
2.  Recent economic developments 
At the same time,  inflation  has  fallen  sharply.  In  December  1996,  year-on-year inflation 
was 14.8% while a year before the corresponding figure was 28.9%. The fall  in  inflation 
was ac;companied  by  a decline  in  interest rates.  The weighted  average interest rates on 
kroon loans of more than one year fell  from an a\terage of 16.06% per annum in ·March 
1996,  to  13.88%  in  December  1996.  Moreover,  these figures  underestimate the fall  in 
interest costs incurred by Estonian customers, since a growing share of loans were made 
in  foreign currencies (DM and  US$),  for  which  interest rates are lower than for  kroon 
loans. However, real interest rates became positive, as the decline in  nominal interest rates 
was less rapid than the fall in inflation,.  • · 
The  gen~r~l  ~ov.ernment deficit  for  1996  reached  I.  5%  of GOP,  higher  than  in  1995. 
HOwever,  controls on  local  government borrowings were introduced in  1996  and  some 
taxes were raised. 
Restructuring of the economy progressed further in  1996.  Privatization advanced rapidly, 
and by the end of 1996 practically all  large enterprises had .been sold,  with the exception 
of those in the transport, telecommunication and energy sectors. The consolidation of the 
financial  sector continued through an uninterrupted process of mergers.  Estonian banks 
are now among the largest anci strongest banks in the Baltic states. 
Given that inflation in Estonia remained higher than in most of  its trading partners, the real 
exchange rate of  the kroon appreciated by 8. 8 % in  1996. This was one of  the causes of  a 
sharp deterioration in the trade deficit, from 8.1  million kroons in  1995 to  13,6 million in 
1996  (on  a  customs  basis),  equivalent  to  more  than  24%  of GOP.  Despite  growing 
surpluses in services and net income, as well as a positive balance on transfers, the current 
account deficit increased in  1996 to 5.3  million kroons, just less than  10% of GOP.  The 
financing  of this  deficit  was  less  satisfactory  in  1996  than  in  1995:  foreign  direct 
investment  decreased,  and  inflows  of portfolio  investment  and  foreign  bond  issues  by 
I 
banks went up.  Also, Estonian foreign direct investment abroad increased sharply in  1996, 
·in particular to the other Baltic countries and to Russia.  Nevertheless, the overall balance 
of  payments remained in surplus.  .  · 
3.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Official  foreign  debt remained  small  and  stood at  US$  296  million  on  1 January  1997. 
Gross international reserves continued to increase, reaching US$ 640 million at the end of 
1996. Net international reserves also increased. In July 1996, the IMF approved a new 13-
month stand-by arrangement for Estonia, of an  amount equivalent to SDR 13.95  million. 38 
Estonia  has  made  no  purchases  under  either  the  previous  or  the  current  stand-by 
arrangement.  In  1996,  as  in  1995,  Estonia  did  not  request  a  drawing  on  the  second 
tranche  of the  Community's  macro-financial  assistance.  On  the  contrary,  the  Estonian 
authorities asked to repay early the first tranche, of  ECU 20 million,  which was disbursed 
in March 1993. 39 
VI. LATVIA 
1.  Introduction 
Although Latvia only gained independence in August  1991,  it  had  already initiated some 
reforms  under  Soviet  rule.  In  1992,  while  the  country  was  actively  engaged  in 
transformation to a market economy, economic prospects worsened.  The dismantling of 
former trade relations, and  the increases in prices of Russian energy exports resulted in  a 
major trade shock.  Deficits in the external accounts were considered to be unsustainable 
without  international  support.  Latvia  defined  a  stabilization  and  reform  programme 
covering the period  mid-1992  to mid-1993  and  concluded a stand-by arrangement with 
the IMF.  The Community and other G-24 donors were also  called  on  to contribute to 
filling the remaining balance-of-payments gap for the programme period, Pstimated at US$ 
210  million.  On  the  basis  of favourable  prospects  of G-24  support,  the  IMF  board 
approved a stand-by arrangement in late 1992. 
The first three years of independence were marked by  a decline in  output. In  1994 /GOP 
started  to  grow again,  but the incipient  recovery  was  quickly  brought  to  a  half by  a 
banking crisis in  1995.  Private and  public sector deposits were frozen and  interest rates 
rose.  Together  these  led  to  a  decline  in  consumption  and  investment,  as  well  as  a 
reduction in  production;  GOP contracted by  0. 8%.  There was also  a budget crisis:  the 
deficit was double the original target, as tax collection problems were compounded by the 
banking crisis. In  1996, the economy started to recover, with economic growth picking up 
and foreign reserves and banking assets up to pre-crisis levels. 
2.  Recent economic developments 
GOP growth in  1996 reached 2.8%. The increase in activity was largely due to growth in 
transport  and  communications.  However,  the  development  of other  macroeconomic 
indicators in  1996 was not so encouraging:  industrial  production growth was relatively 
modest at  1  %;  retail sales fell;  real wages were flat;  and bank lending was weak. Despite 
the resumption of growth, employment continued to decline,  pushing the unemployment 
rate up to 7.2% in December 1996, compared with 6.6% at the end of 1995. 
Public  finances  were successfully brought under  control  in  1996, · with  the fiscal  deficit 
lower than expected. In addition, inflation came down steadily throughout 1996. Year-end 
inflation  was  down  to  13%  from  23%  in  1995.  As  inflation  slowed,  so  interest  rates 
continued to come down. 
On the external side, preliminary figures for 1996 show that the trade deficit continued to 
rise  as  export growth was outstripped by  import  growth.  This  led  to a very  high  trade 
def~cit,  estimated  at  16%  of GOP.  The  surplus  on  services  partly  offset  this,  but  the 
current account deficit rose to 6.8% ofGDP. 
The authorities continued to pursue a stable exchange rate policy, with an informal peg to 
the SDR. The exchange rate of the lat against the dollar at the end of 1996 remained at 
approximately the same level as at the end of 1995.  Since there was two-digit inflation, 
this  represented  a real appreciation of the currency,  but overall  the  economy remained 
competitive. 
During  1996,  the  privatization  process  received  a  boost  from  the  new  government: 
•":Sj..H.'i1Sitd;tv for the WIJrk  Wl!C:  c~el'ltra!ized in  the Latvian Privatization Agency and nearly 40 
all  the assets were transferred to it.  As  a result, the privatization process became more 
transparent and quick, as well as more accessible to foreign investors. 
The banking sector appeared to have recovered from the crisis of 199 5:  assets were back 
to pre-crisis levels and enterprise deposits were rising again.  However, the banking sector 
continued to suffer from a low level of activity:  bank lending was limited by  the lack of 
liquid collateral, by insufficient skills in  assessing business risk and  by  a scarcity of long-
term savings available for on-lending. 
3.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
In November 1992, the Council14  approved macro-financial assistance of up to ECU 80 
million for Latvia, corresponding to about 50% of  the balance-of-payments gap. The bulk 
of the bilateral support from  the G-24 came from  Japan and  EFT A countries.  The loan 
agreement and memorandum of understanding between the  Community and  Latvia was 
signed in early  1993,  and  the Commission disbursed  the first  tranche (50% of the loan 
amount) in March 1993. The first tranche was used mainly to on-lend to state and pJjvate 
enterprises in  order to  help  them  finance  imports  in  priority  areas.  The  release --c,f  the 
second tranche was to be made following  a positive evaluation of performance criteria, 
-regarding both macroeconomic stabilization and  progress of structural reform, as set out 
in the memorandum of  understanding. 
The Commission, after consulting Member States, exceptionally agreed in  a supplemental 
memorandum  of understanding,  signed  in  1994,  to  allow  the  proceeds  of the  second 
tranche of assistance to be channelled to  profitable projects, through the banking sector. 
However, in  1994 and early  1995, the country's external accounts were in  surplus owing 
to  substantial  private  capital  inflows,  and  the  Latvian  authorities  did  not  request  the 
release ofthe second tranche. 
In June 1995, after the financial and budgetary c~ises, the Latvian authorities requested.the 
release  of the  second  tranche  of the  Community  loan  (ECU 40  million),  in  order  to 
channel the funds to refund small depositors who had lost their savings during the banking 
crisis. The Commission considered that such a use ofthe funds would be inconsistent first 
with the general aim of EC macro-financial assistance, and second with the undertakings 
of the  supplemental  memorandum  of understanding  relating  to  the  second  tranche.  In 
addition, the conditionality criteria of the loan required that the I:MF programme show a 
satisfactory track record, which was not the case: the normal autumn review of the stand-
by  programme  could  not  be  completed.  The  Commission  therefore  declined  the 
authorities') request, and the second tranche was not released. 
In May 1996, the IMF approved a 15-month stand-by arrangement for an amount of SDR 
30  ~illion, and the associated IMF programme remains on track.  In late  1995  and early 
1996 the Commission services asked the Latvian authorities to provide fi.1rther  details of 
the use of the first tranche of the loan.  This request was prompted by the high  degree of 
government involvement in the process of  allocating the first tranche, and the granting of 
government guarantees on the majority ofthe loan amount. The Commission subsequently 
requested that.  the Latvian authorities suspend  reuse of repayments on  sub-loans,  make 
14  Council Decision 92/542/EEC (O.J. L351 of2 December 1992). 41 
provisions  for  losses  on  re-lending,  and  improve  assessment  and  monitoring  of risks 
related to on-lending. 42 
Vll. LITHUANIA 
1.  Introduction 
Having recovered sovereignty in  1991, Lithuania faced the formidable task of  establishing 
a market economy while setting up the institutional  machinery of an  independent state. · 
Moreover, the problems of transition were compounded by  the break-up of close input 
and output relations with the Soviet Union and by the increase of  prices of  energy imports 
from  Russia  to  world  levels.  As  a  consequence  of these  shocks,  hyper-inflationary 
conditions developed in  1992 and· Lithuania suffered the most severe  output contraction 
in Central and Eastern Europe. The economic downturn, however, was brought to an end 
in  1994 when the introduction of  a currency board regime established the conditions for a 
return to macroeconomic stability. 
Since  mid-1992,  Lithuania's  reforms  have  been  supported  by  the  lMF  through  two 
successive  stand-by  arrangements  and  a  three-year  Extended  Fund  Facility  expiring  in 
October  1997.  Within  the  context  of the  first  stand-by,  the European  CounciJI~ puide 
available complementary macro-financial  assistance of  up to ECU l 00 million.  / 
2.  Recent Economic Developments 
During  1996,  the Lithuanian  economy continued  to  grow in  spite of the banking  crisis 
which developed at the end of 1995, when two banks, representing more than 20% of  the 
value of total deposits, were declared insolvent.  This immediately led to capital outflows, 
which,  together  with  the  freezing  of deposits  in  the  insolvent  banks,  caused a  sizeable 
monetary contraction and  depressed  domestic  demand.  In  the  second  half of the year, 
however, confidence returned and growth picked up again, led by agriculture and exports; 
industrial production remained substantially flat.  As a result,  during  1996, GDP grew by 
3.6%, marking a further acceleration ofthe economic recovery which·had begun in  1994 
and gained momentum in  1995. 
Further  significant  progress  towards  price  stabilization  was  achieved  in  1996.  After 
peaking at a hyper-inflationary level in  1992, December-on-December inflation fell  sharply 
to roughly 36% by the end of 1995. This trend continued during  1996 when the year-on-
year rate decreased further to  13%.  The wors_ening  trend  in  the unemployment situation 
was reversed iTt  1996 as the rate of  unemployment fell by roughly one percentage point to 
6.2%. 
The  evolution  of the  trade balance  is  hard  to  assess  because  of important  changes  in· 
statistical  methods,  which  make  comparisons  with  observations  from  before  1995 
impossible.  Nevertheless, according to the available figures,  during  1996,  the deficits on 
the trade and current account deteriorated slightly in terms of US$ but improved in terms 
of percentage points of  GDP. Export growth exceeded import growth, and there were no 
signs of any significant loss in international competitiveness. After falling at the beginning 
of  the year, official reserves recovered to a level above two months' imports. 
In  1996 the budget stance was prudent again and the fiscal  deficit equalled' 2. 5% of  GDP. 
As  in  previous years,  however,  a revenue shortfall  (of some 0.7% of GDP) forced  the 
1 s  Council Decision 92/542/EEC taken on 23  November.  1992. 43 
authorities to implement emergency expenditure cuts (affecting mainly public investment 
and agricultural subsidies). The decrease in tax receipts in  1996 was partly due to specific 
factors, such as the collateral effects of the banking crisis,  but it  also continued a trend: 
fiscal  revenues  have  been  declining  continuously  since  independence,  forcing  public 
expenditures down to levels which are hardly compatible with long-term development. 
During  1996,  the banking sector started to  recover from  the crisis of end-1995:  most 
banks recOrded good results and managed to improve the quality of their loan portfolio. 
After some initial  indecision, the government began actively  pursuing  its  three-pronged 
policy based upon a strengthening of the regulatory framework,  a rapid clean-up of the 
troubled banks' balance sheets and e~ntual privatization. Exposure rules were tightened 
International accounting standards and capital adequacy  rules were· introduced.  A  loan 
recovery unit for the cleaning up of  non-performing loans was set up, and a draft law for 
the compensation of  deposit-holders in failed banks was submitted to Parliament. 
Structural reforms  in  other  areas  such  as  the  energy  sector,  agriculture,  the  pension 
system  aDd  enterprise  ownership  also  advanced  during  J  996.  The  pace  of reform, 
however, remained somewhat disappointing,  partly ,because of the considerable political 
uncertainty which followed the resignation of  Prime Minister Slezevicius in February 1996 
and prececled·the October general elections. Following the electoral victory of  tile centre-
right coalition, implementation of  structural reforms accelerated. 
3.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance  •• 
The first  tranche of Community assistance (ECU 50 million) was disbursed in  July  1993. 
The first ECU 25  million instalment of  the second tranche (ECU 50 million) was disbursed 
in August .1995, on the basis of  a Supplemental Memorandum of Understanc;iing.  As in the 
case of Latvia  and  Estonia,  the  Memorandum  earmarked  the  proceeds of the  second 
tranche for sound  bankab~ projects,  on condition that the funds  would  be  channelled 
through  banks complying with  prudential  regulations  and  would  follow  a  well-defined 
procedur.e  for  consulting  the  Commission.  However,  because  of shortcomings  in  the 
implementation of  this consultation process, the Commission requested a freeze in the use 
of proceeds  of Community  assistance  in  September  1995.  During  1996,  significant 
improvements  in  the  consultation  process  were  achieved.  In  April,  the  Lithuanian 
authorities. sent an annual report on the status ofthe macro-financial operation. Moreover, 
they properly consulted the Commission when requesting the use of  the frozen proceeds. 
In  view  of this  satisfactory  progress,  the  Commission  was  able  to  unblock  ECU  0.6 
million  for  one  financing  prop0$&1  presented  by  the  Lithuanian  authorities  which  was 
compatible with the provisions of  the Supplemental Memorandum of  Understanding. 44 
VID.MOLDOVA 
1.  Introduction 
By  the  end  of  1996,  Moldova  had  made  substantial  progress  in  macroeconomic 
stabilization.  The  authorities  embarked  on  a  comprehensive  programme  of finanCial 
stabilization at the beginning of 1993.  A coherent and  consistent set of policy measures 
allowed a marked reduction of the budget deficit and inflation.  Interest rates declined to 
moderate levels,  and  the exchange rate remained  stable.  However,  only limited  success 
was  achieved  in  enforcing  hard  budget  cqnstraints  on enterprises  and  in  developing  a 
priyate agricultural sector. Output recovery did not materialize. Major progress was made 
towards creating a market  ~conomy, despite a severe deterioration of the terms of trade, 
the Joss  of traditional markets,  and the disruption of trade and  financial  relations in  the 
aftermath of  the dissolution of  the Soviet Union. 
Macro-financial assistance provided by the international community has helped to enhance 
the efforts of the Moldovan authorities.  After two  stand-by arrangements  in  1993  and 
/ 
1995, the IMF Board in May 1996 approved a three-year credit under the extended fund 
facility  in  support of an  economic and  reform  programme covering the period  1996-98. 
Those interventions were complemented by assistance from other multilateral and bilateral 
donors, including two loans from the European Union. 
2.  Macroeconomic performance 
In  1996  GOP  is  estimated to  have  declined  by  8%,  thus  continuing  the  negative trend 
which  has  characterized  the  Moldovan  economy  since  1991.  Agricultural  production 
declined  by  13%.  A  precise  estimate  of the  decline  in  industrial  production  is  not  yet 
available,  but a sharp fall  in  the second half of the year more than offset some positive 
growth in the first months of 1996. These indicators, however, are likely to underestimate 
the  amount of economic  activity  in  the  country,  since  the  growing  amount  of private 
activity is not fully captured in the official statistics. 
Macroeconomic  policy  presented  in  1996  some  contradictory  aspects:  while  monetary 
policy remained rather restrictive, Moldova experienced acute fiscal  problems. At the end 
of 1996,  the  budget  deficit  amounted  to  7.2%  of GOP  (10%  of GOP  if calculated 
according to the  methodology  used  by  the  Moldovan authorities).  The  deficit  resulted 
from  an  increase  in  expenditure  combined  with  a  substantial  decline  in  revenue  with 
respect to the previous year.  The deficit was financed  through a combination of internal 
financing  and  foreign  loans.  Increasing  reliance  on  external  financing  contributed  to a 
steady increase of the external debt, which increased from  $16 million at the end of 1992 
to more than $818 million at the end of 1996.  More than one third of the debt is  short-
tenll, i.e., with maturities below 5 years. 
After  a  period  of stability,  inflation  accelerated  somewhat  in  the last  quarter of 1996, 
reflecting the relaxation of economic policy.  On  average,  consumer prices  increased by 
23.5% during 1996. 
The nominal  exchange rate  of the leu  depreciated  very  slowly  after  its  introduction  in 
November  1993.  As  the  depreciation  remained  well  below  the  inflation  rate,  the  leu 
appreciated steadily in real terms. This real appreciation was one of  the main causes of  the 
sharp deterioration of the trade balance. The trade deficit for  1996 is  estimated at about 
$180 million.  It resulted  from  a sharp increase  in  imports of goods and  services. and  a 45 
decline  of exports.  The current account deficit  for  1996  is  estimated  at  $245  million. 
Trade data suggest that there has been a noticeable increase in  imports of capital goods, 
which  will  add  to  productive capacity.  However,  the  deterioration  also  stems  from  a 
marked increase in imports of  consumer goods. This probably reflects the inability of most 
domestic firms, which in many cases have not undergone any substantial restructuring, to 
compete with imported goods. 
3.  Structural reform 
Significant  progress has been made with structural and  institutional  reforms in  the past 
few  years.  However,  the  process  is  far  from  completed.  In  particular,  the process  of 
privatization seemed t'o  lose much of  its momentum after the end of mass privatization at 
the end of October 1996. The orivatization by tender of a selected number of enterprises 
for cash was delayed several times. Furthermore, the significant transfer of property rights 
to  private  agents  did  not  prompt  significant  changes  in  the  behaviour  of enterprises. 
Governance was still inadequate, insiders dominated firms,  and. the budget constraint w~s 
not hardened enough. There was little evidence of  enterprise restructuring, as  testifie~ by, 
among  other  things,  the  low  level  of redundancies.  There  was  no  attempt  by  the 
authorities to isolate 'bad' firms from viable ones, or to develop a strategy for dealing with 
the worst loss-makers. 
Officially  registered  unemployment  remained  very  low,  with  an  unemployment  rate  of 
1.8% at the end of 1996. However, there was widespread  hidd~n~tmemployment - in the 
form of part-time work or unpaid  leave- which,  if properly accounted for,  would bring 
the  unemployment  rate  at  the  end  of 1996  to  approximately  15%.  The  effects  of the 
transformation on living standards is  not clear.  On  the one hand,  income is  increasingly 
generated from private trading or foreign exchange activities - forms which are unlikely to 
be captured accurateiy by official statistics - find  less from  wages,  salaries and  pensions. 
On  the other hand,  macro  indicators - such  as  a significant  fall  in  life  expectancy - or 
sample surveys suggest an overall deterioration, which is  especially severe for vulnerable 
sections of  the population like pensioners or families with· dependent children. 
4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
On  13  June  1994  the Council of the European Union decided  to  grant  the  Republic of 
Moldova a loan of ECU 45  million with a maximum duration of ten years  16  to assist the 
country in  its efforts to transform its economy into a market economy and to strengthen 
the  reserve  position of the  central  bank.  The  Community  loan  was  part  of an  overall 
package mobilized by the international donor community for Moldova to complement the 
resources  provided  by  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank.  The  first  tranche  of the  loan, 
amounting to ECU 25 million, was disbursed in December 1994. The disbursement of the 
secmnd tranche, of  ECU 20 million, took place in August 1995. 
The  international  donor  community  recognized  that  to  ensure  a  sound  balance  of 
payments  situation  in  the  1995-1996  period,  further  macro-financial  assistance  for 
Moldova was necessary to complement the resources provided by the IMF and the World 
Bank. In November 1995 the Commission formally adopted a proposal for further macro-
financial assistance to Moldova ofup to ECU 15 million. 
16  Council Decision 9~/346/EC. 
' 46 
On 25  March 1996, the Council decided to adopt the Commission proposal. 17  Following 
this decision and the approvaJ by the IMF Board, in May ·1996, of a new 3-year economic 
reform  programme,  and  after  positive  verification  by  the  Commission  services  of the 
fulfilment of the conditions attached to this assistance,  the disbursement of the ECU 15 
million took place in December 1996. 
' 7  Council Decision 96/242/EC. '47 
IX. ROMANIA 
l.  Introduction . 
Despite  positive  growth  in  1996,  and  progress  on  privatization,  the  new  authorities 
elected in November 1996 inherited a fragile economic situation, the result of insufficient 
progress  towards  structural  adjustment  since  1989.  In  fact,  between  1989  and  1996, 
successive governments repeatedly launched new  reform  programmes,  only to abandon 
them a few months afterwards in the face of mounting political resistance. Public support 
for  reform  has  fluctuated  accordingly:  it  was  substantial  at  the  beginning  of the 
transformation, then substantially diminished in the face of  mounting costs brought by the 
transition,  only  to  strengthen  again  when  it  became  apparent  that  the  path  of partial 
reform followed between 1989 and 1996 was ,leading to an impasse. 
Although growth resumed in 1994, the relatively satiEfactory macroeconomic performance 
registered  up  to  1996  masked  insufficient  progress  in  structural  reform,  including 
restructuring of enterprises and of the agricultural sector.  In the run-up to the Nov~mber 
1996 presidential and legislative elections, the authorities loosened macroeconomic-policy 
and reintroduced numerous administrative controls (in particular on the exchange market 
and on foreign trade). The inherent contradictions ofthe economic policies ofthe 1989-96 
period  were only fully  addressed  after the elections  of November  1996,  when the  new 
government devised a  radi~al programme of macroeconomic  stabilization and  structural 
reform, and began to implement it. 
In 1996, major policy slippages by the previous government led to a sharp deterioration in 
Romania's relations with the lMF,  the World  Bank and  private investors.  The previous 
IMF stand-by arrangement of$ 460 million went off track and  then had to be cancelled. 
The World Bank made the first  $80 million payment under its $280 million Financial and 
Enterprise  Structural  Adjustment  Loan  and  then  froze  further  disbursements.  The 
Community also could not disburse the second tranche, of  a maximum amount of  ECU 70 
million,  of the  macro-financial  assistance  loan  decided  in  1994.  After  the  November 
elections, the IFls took an active role in advising the new government on its economic and 
social policies. 
2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Despite  declining  unemployment,  the  macroeconomic  performance  m  1996  was  less 
satisfactory  than  in  the  previous  two  years:  growth  slowed  down  to  4. 1%,  inflation 
accelerated  to  56.9%  at  the  end  of December  and  the  budget  deficit  of the  general 
government soared to 3. 9% of  GOP. In fact, economic activity continued to expand at the 
cost of  increasing macro- and micro-economic disequilibria. 
I 
In  1996, industrial output rose by  9.9%. The situation of the agricultural sector was far 
less satisfactory, with estimates indicating a significant drop in the harvest (by as much as 
a quarter in tonnage), largely caused by adverse weather conditions. Exports also declined 
in  the course of the year,  and  GDP growth slowed to 4.1 %, a drop of three percentage 
points  over  199 5.  Growth achieved  in  1996  was  sufficient  to  push  jown the  rate  of 
unemployment,  from  8. Q%  in  December  1995  to  6. I%  a  year  later.  However,  since 
industry was still  shedding workers, growth in  employment was  recorded  mostly in  the 
other sectors of  the economy (services, construction, and also agriculture). 48 
To  a  large  extent,  however,  economic  growth  in  1996  was  based  on  very  unstable 
foundations.  Many  large  state-owned  industrial  companies  and  state farms  were  not 
subject to a "hard budget constraint" (i.e. they did not face a real risk of  bankruptcy even 
when they consistently made losses), because they were able to obtain cheap credits from 
state-owned commercial banks, which in turn refinanced themselves easily at the National 
Bank.  In fact,  refinancing from the National Bank more than doubled during  1996.  This 
process artificially stimulated  activity while  maintaining widespread iQ.efticiencies  within 
the economy. 
In the run-up to the elections,  the previous government embarked  on  a spending spree 
(credit  to  the  government  almost  doubled  in  nominal  terms  between -August  and 
November).  As  a result,  the budget deficit soared dramatically.  The general government 
deficit rose from 2.6 to 3.9% of GOP, and  ta 8.3% of GOP for the quasi-fiscal  deficit, 
which includes a number of hidden expenditure items and  quasi-fiscal  subsidies from the 
National Bank of Romania.  The year 1996 saw a significant  increase in  inflation,  which 
jumped from  an annual rate of 27.8% in  1995  to almost 57%.  Inflation was particularly 
high in November (monthly rate of+5.8%) and December (+10.3%).  ,. 
External trade significantly worsened in  1996.  Not only did  exports and  imports fall,  in 
dollar terms, but the trade deficit for 1996 is estimated to have risen to $2. 1 billion from 
$1.6 bn in  1995.  Exports continued to suffer from the decline of some of  the main export 
markets,  as well as the poor competitiveness of domestic products.  The current account 
deficit  reached  $2.3  b11liori  (approximately  6.6%  of GDP).  Foreign  direct  investment 
increased slightly to  $555 million according to EBRD estimates, a relatively low level for 
a country of Romania's size.  In  per capita terms,  only Bulgaria has attracted less foreign 
direct investment among the I  0 associated countries of  eastern Europe. 
In  199(5,  the gross foreign reserves of the banking system grew significantly,  which was 
largely the result of  Romania's return to the international capital markets, where it raised 
$1.4 billion through syndicated loans and  bond issues.  Its issues on the Japanese market 
(so-called "Samurai bonds") met with considerable interest. While this was a positive vote 
of  confidence by international investors, it helped push Romania's medium- and long-term 
external debt to a higher level ($6.9 billion, almost a one-third increase over 1995). Given 
that investment remains weak, the growth of  the foreign debt could become a problem in 
the future.  The debt service obligations (including  short-term debt  service)  increased to 
20.2% of  exports of  goods and services, from  14.5% in 1995.  · 
3.  StruCtural reform 
Progress on structural reform  remained  ambivalent.  On  the  one  hand,  little  action  was 
taken  in  1996  to  restructure  the  large  loss-making  state-owned  companies  (e.g.,  the 
electricity company RENEL lost 600 billion lei  in the first  ten months of 1996, equivalent 
to  $183  million  at  the  October  exchange  rate).  Nor  was  anything  lone  to  rectify 
shortcomings in the agricultural sector: a normal market for buying and selling land  was 
not functioning.  Inter-enterprises arrears continued to expand: for the energy sector alone, 
it  is  estimated that,  at the end  of 1996,  the stock of arrears to supplier.s  and  the state 
amounted to 3.3% ofGDP. 
In  March  1996,  the  authorities  introduced  significant  curbs  on  the  foreign  exchange 
markets, restricting the number of official dealers to four Romanian banks, three of them 
state-owned.  This  led  to an  overvaluation of the  national  currency,  which  encouraged 49 
cheap  energy  imports  for  the  large  and  inefficient,  energy-intensive,  state-owned 
enterprises. The overvaluation of the leu also discouraged exports.  The gap between the 
official rate and  the rate of the  privat~ exchange bureaux rose to approximately 45% in 
mid-November, a clear sign of  widespread distortions. 
The  programme  of "financial  isolation"  of a  number  of large  state-owned  "regies 
autonomes" failed to improve their financial situation and was subsequently abandoned in 
early  1997.  Reform  of the  agricultural  sector  did  not  progress  much  either.  On  the 
contrary, support from explicit and implicit  subsidies and  tran!fers soared in  1996 from 
4.3%  to  5%  of GOP.  Subsidized  credits  from  the  National  Bank  of Romania  to the 
agricultural  sector were  one  of the  main  reasons  why  monetary  policy  was  derailed. 
Moreover,  the  larger  part of the  financial  suppor1  was  captured  by  intermediaries  and 
producers of  agriculturallnp':lts, at the expense of  farmers themselves. 
Nevertheless, a few.'positive developments can be identified:  mass privatization continued 
unabated ( 1300 operati"fts ·had  been carried out as  of 10  December  1996,  bringing  t~e 
cumulative figure since 1993  to 2766 companies), although it concerned essentially _small 
cgmpanies; some export bans were abolished while many export quotas were expanded; a 
new  secondary stock market  (the RASDAQ)  opened  in  October with  1342  companies 
already listed. 
4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
In its decision of 20  June  1994, the Council had decided to grant to Romania a medium-
term  balance-of-payments  loan  for  a  maximum  amount  of ECU  125·  million,  to  be 
disbursed  in  two  tranches 111.  The  economic  policy  conditions  for  the  release  of this 
assistance  were  agreed  by  the  Commission  and  the  Romanian  authorities  in  a 
Memorandum of Understanding  signed  in  December  1994.  A first  tranche of ECU  55 
million was disbursed in November 1995.  · 
How.ever,  the  release  of the  second  tranche  was  not  possible  in  1996,  because  of 
persistent  mal-functioning  of the  foreign  exchange  market  and  lack  of progress  on 
structural  reforms.  For  the  same  reasons,  the  stand-by  arrangement  (SBA)  with  the 
International  Monetary Fund  (IMF)  went off t~ack and  then  had  to  be  cancelled.  The 
World Bank also froze disbursement of  the second tranche of the Financial and Enterprise 
Structural Adjustment Loan (FESAL). 
.'I 
Following the elections of November 1996, the new Romanian government requested the 
reactivation of  the Community's and the G-24's..macro-financial assistance, in the context 
of an  ambitious  economic  programme  of macroeconomic  stabilization  and  structural 
reforms supported by the International Financial Institutions. 
18  Council Decision 94/369/EC. 50 
X UKRAINE 
1.  Introduction 
The Ukrainian  authorities  achieved  considerable  financial  stabilization  in  1996,  but the 
economy  continued  to  contract,  though  at  a  slower  pace.  The  implementation  of a 
relatively tight monetary policy set by the Ukrainian central bank was a determining factor 
in drastically reducing inflation, stabilizing the exchange rate and  ensuring the successful 
introduction of  a new national currency. 
Stabilization, however, became increasingly fragile,  because of a slow-down in  structural 
reform, especially with respect to privatization, the tax regime and tpe overhauling of the 
public  administration.  The  1997  budget  and  an  accompanying  programme  of 
comprehensive tax and deregulation measures were stalled in  Parliament from November 
1996. 
2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Ukraine's transition to a market economy, which essentially started in  late  1994 after the 
election of President Kuchma,  continued in  1996,  though against an uncertain economic 
background. 
The implementation of  ,a tight monetary policy by  the Ukrainian central bank paved the 
way for  a dramatic reduction in  inflation,  the stabilization of the exchange rate and  the 
smooth  introduction of a  new  currency,  the  hryvnia,  in  September  1996.  Inflation  was 
reduced to 40% at end-1996 (December-on-December), down from  182% a year earlier. 
The fiscal  balance was brought down to  some  -3.2% of GDP (1995:  -5%),  though in 
addition the accumulation of arrears in public wages,  salaries and  pensions amounted to 
some 3.5% ofGDP. 
Although production continued to decline during 1996, the rate of  decline was lower than 
in  previous years.  Real GDP contracted by  another 1  o%  in  1996, but this does not take 
into account the increasing activity in the unofficial  sector, which is estimated to equate 
more than 50% of  official GDP. Agricultural production saw a further sharp reduction (by 
some  10%)  in  1996,  which  can  be only  partly  attributed  to  poor weather conditions. 
Agriculture's share ·in  GDP  is  now only  13%  in  a  country which  was once the "bread 
basket of the Soviet Union". Industrial production continued to decline in  1996 (by some 
5%), and machine-building especially suffered a sharp reduction. 
The  trade  statistics  for  Ukraine  are  very  unreliable,  but  it  seems  that  external  trade 
continued  to  grow rapidly  in  1996.  Trade  with  other former  Soviet  Union  countries, 
Ukraine's major trade partners, began to recover. Exports of goods are reported to have 
grown  by· almost  14%  in  1996  to  $  15.5  billion,  a  notable  achievement  against  a 
background of  continuing recession. 
Because of  significant increases in  Russian gas prices, imports grew by 24% in  1996 to 
$ 19.8 billion.  Because the higher energy import prices entailed higher transit fees for the 
transport of gas  through the  Ukrainian  pipeline  system  to Central  Europe,  overall  the 
current  account  deficit  was  not  affected  too  seriously:  it  was  $  1.3  billion  in  1996, 
equivalent to 3.9% ofGDP. 51 
Unemployment  remained  at  artificially  low  levels.  Official  data  indicate  that 
unemployment was about 1-l.  5% of the total labour force  in  1996,  but these figures do 
not take account of  considerable hidden unemployment in Ukraine. 
3.  Structural reform 
The  main  reason  for  the  continuing  economic  decline  in  Ukraine  lies  in  the  lack  of 
substantial  industrial  and  enterprise  restructuring.  The  need  to  restructure  Ukraine's 
economy,  which under Soviet control became disproportionately dependent  on  military 
production, was clear from the first  days of independence.  The government's efforts to 
launch serious restructuring programmes in both industry and agriculture have often faced 
the opposition of  the sizeable conservative forces in Parliament. 
Against this adverse backdrop, some progress in  structural reform was· achieved in  1996. 
In the area of land reform, the issuing and registration of  land titles proceeded well.  In the 
banking sector, the assets of  the thirty largest banks were assessed and the management of 
two troubled banks was closely monitored by  the central  bank.  Privatization,  however, 
slowed  down  markedly.  While  the  privatization  of. small-scale  enterprises  was  nearly 
complete, only 3,500 out of  the 8,000 targeted large state enterprises had been  ~rivatized 
by September 1996. 
The  authorities  have  identified  some  400  large  enterprises  for  privatization  through 
international tender. The list of  enterprises includes energy compa~ies and other firms that 
performed well  during Soviet times.  Lack of progress  in  privatization and  the uncertain 
credibility of the reform effort have limited  the amount of foreign  direct investment that 
Ukraine has been able to attract. Per capita foreign direct investment in  Ukraine remained 
one of  the lowest among all transition countries. 
In an attempt to combat negative trends in the economy and to move reforms forward, the 
government submitted to the Ukrainian parliament in  November 1996,  together with the 
1997 budget, a new programme of reforms.  The programme, which  included significant 
cuts in  budget spending,  a comprehensive tax reform  and  a further  liberalization of the 
economy,  was  welcomed  as  the  second  stage  of major  liberal  economic  reforms  in 
Ukraine,  long awaited after the first  serious reforms were launched  at  the end of 1994. 
However, ~t met strong opposition from the parliament. 
4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
In December 1994, the Council decided to provide a first macro-financial loan of ECU 85 
million to support Ukraine's adjustment and reform process. 19  This long-term loan was to 
be disbursed in  a single tranche conditional upon an  IMF  stand-by arrangement,  a rapid 
·implementation of the EU/G-7 Nuclear Safety Action Plan for Ukraine and progress with 
stru'ctural reform.  After significant delays on the part of Ukraine,  it  was finally  disbursed 
in December 1995. 
In view of Ukraine's urgent financial needs and  against the background of further efforts 
being made by the Ukrainian authorities to pursue economic reform, the Council decided 
in  October  1995  to  provide  Ukraine  with  a  second  macro-financial  loan  of ECU  200 
19  Council Decision 94/940/EC. 52 
million  that  would  complement  financial  assistance  from  the  international. financial 
institutions and  bilateral donors. 2o  The first  tranche of ECU  I  00 million of this loan was 
released in the second half of 1996. 
2° Council Decision 95/442/EC. 